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Abstract 
An organizations´ level of sustainability has so far been primarily been analyzed 
within the context of economic performance. This study changes that dependent 
variable to “resilience”, namely a company’s ability to recover from potential lethal 
shocks or disruptive events. The research questions aims to investigate whether 
sustainability and resilience are related. This study utilizes the financial crisis from 
2007/08 as disruptive event, as it encompassed market phase-out but also survival by 
established firms. Two Swiss luxury watchmaking companies have been chosen as 
industry sample and the study’s investigation is based on a comparative case study 
approach. The latter applies both quantitative data, in the form of the respective 
annual company reports, and qualitative data, in the form of semi-structured 
interviews with three stakeholder groups. Findings indicate that the investigated 
measures of sustainability are related the investigated companies’ level of resilience. 
These findings contribute to the building of new theory towards resilience as this 
study outlines specifically which measures have been proven to be of relevance for 
companies’ resilience. Moreover, the results are of high relevance for companies that 
are operating in constant evolving markets and struggling adapting to any disruptive 
environment as it is outlined why and how comparative companies have to be 
sustainable in order to become more resilient towards future shocks. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Definition and Objectives 
In the late 1970s, the quartz technology innovation and the resulting low prices of quartz-
based watch models disrupted an entire industry and heralded the start of organizational 
failure and bankruptcy. The Swiss watchmaking industry, which encompassed about 1,600 
watchmakers in 1970, shrunk to around 600 firms in 1985 (Cassia, Fattore, & Paleari, 2006). 
Up until 2008, the watchmaking industry recovered at a relatively steady pace, but was 
interrupted by the global financial crisis in 2007/088. Although only a very few watchmaking 
firms became insolvent in direct consequence of the crisis, firms in the luxury segment 
struggled for profits because their products are not necessities, in contrast to items like 
clothing; as a result, potential purchase decisions are easily postponed. Moreover, industry 
analysts declared the official announcement of the Apple Watch on September 10, 2014 the 
next disruptive innovation for the luxury watchmaking industry (Kharpal, 2014). Needless to 
say, the announcement resulted in share price losses of stocks for companies active in the 
Swiss luxury watchmaking industry; specifically, Swatch Group’s share price declined by 2% 
same day, while Richemont’s share price declined by 1.3% by the same day. 
Innovations or shocks with a particularly destructive character are defined as disruptive 
shocks or disruptive innovations. Consequently, the question arises why some organizations 
survive and are resilient while others struggle and fail. The term “resilience” refers to an 
organization’s ability to recover from potentially fatal disruptive innovations or shocks. 
However, what actually makes established organizations resilient? Previous research 
identified three major factors that lead to resilience: financial autonomy, the creation of an 
internal community of cooperative people, and the construction of an external ecosystem of 
partners (De Geus, 2002). Moreover, recent research has linked an organization’s level of 
sustainability to the concept of resilience (Folke et al., 2010). 
Organizations’ behavior is mostly driven by economic factors. In contrast, measures of 
sustainability are e.g. related to consumers’ increasing awareness regarding an organization’s 
compliance with social and environmental standards, meaning non-economic factors. 
Consequently, the question arises whether it is worthwhile for companies to invest in 
sustainability. As a significant amount of existing research has investigated the impact of 
sustainability on an organization’s financial performance, this study replaced the dependent 
variable “performance” with “resilience.” Based on this fundamental adjustment, this study 
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investigates the influence of sustainability on organizations’ resilience and the respective 
ability to survive disruptive innovations or shocks. Subsequently, the research question was 
formulated as follows: “How Does Sustainability Relate to Organizations’ Resilience?”. 
In order to determine how sustainability is related to an organization’s resilience, it is 
essential to identify an industry that encountered external shocks, preferably through 
disruptive innovations. Based on this precondition, the industry also has to be characterized 
by exit or market phase-out as well as survival by existing organizations contingent on the 
respective event. With the Swiss luxury watchmaking sector, this study has incorporated an 
industry that has survived both a disruptive innovation in the form of quartz technology in the 
1970s and an industry shock in the form of the global financial crisis in 2008. The practical 
relevance of the utilization of the Swiss luxury watchmaking industry as the foundation of 
this study is concluded by the industry’s economic relevance as the Swiss luxury 
watchmaking industry was the third highest exporter with CHF 21.4 bn (USD 22.9 bn) in 
2013 (Credit Suisse, 2013). The comparative case study approach of this study is based on 
investigating a sample of two of the biggest watchmaking companies in Switzerland, i.e. 
Swatch Group and Richemont. As no existing theory offers feasible answers on how 
sustainability relates to resilience, this study aims to close the existing theory gap between 
available literature and practical relevance and, moreover, provides a perspective on the 
relation between sustainability and resilience as well as the ability to be resilient against 
future disruptive innovations or shocks. This theory development is not only important to the 
world of research, but also to organizations operating in constantly evolving markets, 
struggling to improve their ability to recover from shocks, that is, their resilience.  
1.2 Course of Investigation  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 presents the current state of theory by defining and 
describing the main terms and concepts involved in the study and related to the research 
question. Chapter 3 describes the watchmaking industry and more thoroughly introduces the 
two investigated watchmaking companies. Chapter 4 functions as a transition between the 
theory development and the industry in terms of the research question as well as the applied 
research model. Chapter 5 describes the methodology in the form of a comparative case study 
before the data and results are presented and discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The 
conclusion (chapter 8) synthesizes the findings and discusses the implications for the overall 
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luxury watchmaking industry. Additionally, some limitations are outlined and some 
opportunities for future research are presented. 
2 Theory Development and Literature Review 
Most industries in the 21st century are increasingly affected by predictable and unpredictable 
changes in the economic environment. These changes tend to create shocks, which may have 
the intensity to restructure the respective industry or the entire market. Therefore, researchers 
and practitioners have demonstrated a growing interest in methods to cope with shocks. This 
chapter aims to discuss the changes in the economic environment, more precisely 
unpredictable shocks and disruptive innovations. The chapter will further discuss the concept 
of resilience as well as environmental and social sustainability. 
2.1 Changes in the Economic Environment 
In the field of economics, a “shock” is an unexpected or unpredictable event that creates a 
significant change within an economy (Dewald & Bowen, 2010). Economic shocks can occur 
in several forms, such as through technological, organizational, or social innovations, and 
typically impact the supply or demand throughout the industry or market. Taleb (2010) called 
these shocks “Black Swans,” which are characterized by three main attributes: (1) they are 
outliers, positioned outside of our expectations as nothing of such nature has occurred before, 
(2) they have an extreme impact, and (3) they exhibit retrospective predictability, meaning 
that they seem predictable and explainable after the event. One example of a Black Swan, 
according to Taleb (2010), is the event of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 
2011. The unpredictability of Black Swans, innovations, or shocks in general highly 
influences any organization’s chances of survival. The advent of unpredictable events can 
have either a positive impact by providing new opportunities or a negative impact by having a 
disastrous effect on the industry. Analysts describe an event as a disruptive shock if it has 
significant market upsetting characteristics or if it might even be the first of its kind to the 
specific industry. Examples of disruptive shocks are technological product innovations such 
as disk drives, but also services and business model innovations such as discount shops. 
With regard to the definition and the scope of disruptive innovations, researchers have 
engaged in a substantial discussion, resulting in a virtually incomprehensible variety of 
explanations (e.g. Adner, 2002; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Danneels, 2004; Govindarajan 
& Kopalle, 2006). According Wessel and Christensen (2012), “Disruptive innovations are 
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like missiles launched at your business” (p. 5). disruptive innovations have the ability to 
broaden and develop new markets or introduce new functionalities, which might disrupt 
established organizations in the market (e.g. Adner, 2002; Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Danneels, 2004; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006).  
Christensen (2014) described the development process of disruptive innovations more 
specifically as “a process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple 
applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, eventually 
displacing established competitors” (first paragraph). While some researchers have supported 
Christensen’s model of disruptive innovations by introducing slightly altered definitions that 
build on Christensen’s theory (e.g. Adner, 2002), other researchers have challenged 
Christensen’s model (e.g. Danneels, 2004; Tellis, 2006). Danneels (2004) claimed that all 
definitions provided by Christensen are neither precise nor consistent. Still, most researchers 
have provided a perspective that is relatively similar to Christensen’s model of disruptive 
innovations. For example, Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) introduced a new innovation 
measure, which is able to quantify the level of an innovation’s disruptiveness 
Nonetheless, researchers have wondered why some established organizations fail to survive 
disruptive innovations, while apparently inferior organizations gain huge market shares and 
even replace incumbent organizations. Disruptive innovations appear to occur so 
intermittently that the parties concerned usually do not have a routine process for managing 
them (Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Downes & Nunes, 2013). When being confronted with 
a disruptive innovation, established organizations face a dilemma. The latter have to decide 
whether the disruptive innovation is adopted, if possible, to the existing model or ignored, 
which increases the risk of long-term squeeze out. However, by adopting the new product or 
service of the potentially disrupting entity, organizations must consider the risk of damaging 
and undermining the existing business or business model (Charitou & Markides, 2012). Thus, 
the challenge is to identify a disruptive innovation as an opportunity, and to capitalize on it 
without diluting the existing resources and products. This approach is especially challenging 
as disruptive innovations are typically both an opportunity and a threat (Dewald & Bowen, 
2010). Succeeding in adapting or being able to ignore a disruptive innovation while 
preventing potential displacement is generally referred to as resilience. 
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2.2 Resilience 
The term “resilience” has its origin within the field of ecology. External conditions to 
ecosystems such as pollution or changes in climate often change unexpectedly and relatively 
short term. While some ecosystems respond in a smooth, continuous way to such changes, 
others respond more strongly once the external conditions reach a critical level (Scheffer, 
Carpenter, Foley, Folke, & Walker, 2001). Scheffer et al. (2001) analyzed that, for some 
environmental conditions, the ecosystem has two alternative stable states, separated by an 
unstable equilibrium that marks the border between the “basin of attraction” of the states. 
Shifts between these described stages can lead to both ecological and economic resource 
losses, while restoring a desired state can involve radical and costly intervention (Mäler, 
2000). As a preliminary conclusion, one can argue that the theory of ecosystems has formed 
the foundation for most studies of resilience; specifically, observed ecosystem resilience is 
closely related to an organization’s ability and capability to resist shocks and return to a stable 
state after a disruption (Holling, 1973; Mäler, 2000; Scheffer et al., 2001). 
Based on this determination, researchers constructed the concept of organizational resilience, 
which is a relatively new field of research (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005) that has been 
applied to several contexts (Hamel & Valikangas, 2003). Organizations’ resilience is related 
to the ability to anticipate disruptions, adapt to unpredictable events, and create lasting value. 
The interconnectivity of different social systems, economic marketplaces, the mobility of 
capital, and the availability of instant communication have led to a situation where the effects 
of instable environments and unpredictable shocks, such as the financial crisis in 2008 or the 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2011, are usually no longer limited to the 
respective economy of origin. As a result, the concept of resilience is gaining more 
recognition by academics as well as the general economy.  
Definitions of organizational resilience differ among and within the different disciplines, as 
do the units of analysis in which the definition has been used (Dewald & Bowen, 2010). 
Some researchers have distinguished between passive and active resilience. Active resilience 
is not simply a reaction to disruptive events; rather, it describes every effort that enables a 
firm to better cope with different forms of surprising or disrupting events. More precisely, 
active resilience includes identifying potential risks and proactive steps to avoid any form of 
replacement or disruption (Longstaff, 2005). In contrast, some economic studies have defined 
resilience in passive terms. Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) described resilience as the ability to 
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capture change with a minimum of disruption. Others (e.g. Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005) 
have defined resilience as a firm’s ability to simply rebound from an event that creates 
disruption or a crisis situation. Considered this way, resilience is basically a reaction to a 
disrupting event or crisis situation and hence viewed as a “pattern rather than a prescribed 
series of steps or activities” (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005, p. 2).  
Summarizing, organizational resilience is related to the theory of disruptive innovation, 
whose introduction contributes to a fast-changing business environment. As described in 
section 2.1.2, the challenge for organizations is to create new organizational routes or deploy 
the disruptive innovation in order to address the threats and opportunities arising from the 
initial innovation as well as the consequently changing environment (Dewald & Bowen, 
2010). De Geus (2002) illustrated that “even big, solid companies [...] seem to hold out for 
not much longer than an average of forty years” (p. 2) and that “in some countries, 40% of all 
newly created companies last less than 10 years” (p. 2). Thus, the question arises how some 
organizations have developed an ability to be resilient to shocks and why others have not. 
Developing organizational resilience seems especially difficult for small organizations, as 
they tend to be more dependent on the efficient usage of resources and consequently more 
inflexible regarding responding to and adopting environmental change from a goods-
producing or service-providing perspective. On the other hand, smaller organizations tend to 
be less limited by compelling corporate roles and contexts and might thus be able to develop 
organizational resilience more easily than corporate decision-makers of larger organizations 
(Corbett & Hmieleski, 2007). Gilbert, Eyring, and Foster (2012) proposed a dual 
transformation approach to develop resilience. The first transformation adapts the core 
business to the realities of the disruptive marketplace. The second transformation creates a 
new business that ensures an organization’s growth. Both transformations need to be separate, 
parallel efforts. Thus, management can utilize the development of a new core strategy 
whereas the innovation business can grow and develop independently without distraction 
while minimizing potential influence on the core business (Gilbert et al., 2012). De Geus 
(2002) identified four major factors that lead to long-lasting companies: sensitivity to the 
environment, cohesiveness with a strong sense of identity, decentralization and tolerance of 
activities on the margin, and conservative financing.  
As this study’s research question addresses how sustainability is related to an organization’s 
resilience—or, in other words, an organization’s sensitivity to the environment—the 
subsequent subchapter serves as an introduction to sustainability. 
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2.3 Sustainability 
In 1987, the Brundtland Commission of the United Nations defined sustainable development 
as the ability to “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland Commission, 1987, p. 41). Even though 
sustainable development is not a recent trend, only in the past decade has the topic gained 
more attention by different political, economic, and private institutions as well as the general 
public. The increased popularity can be observed, for example, in the field of academic 
research as demand for studies on the topic increased noticeably during the same time period. 
Additionally, consumer preferences indicate an increased demand for products produced in a 
sustainable way (Linton, Klassen, & Jayaraman, 2007). As a consequence, organizations are 
challenged by the simultaneous improvement of social and human wellbeing and the resulting 
effects on consumer behavior on the one hand and the reconciliation of reducing the 
ecological footprint while ensuring the efficient achievement of economic goals on the other 
hand.  
Combining the effects and considerations of sustainability with organizational behavior, one 
can conclude that a sustainable organization contributes to sustainable development by rising 
to the challenge of delivering economic and social as well as environmental benefits 
simultaneously. The three principles of sustainability, namely economic, environmental, and 
social sustainability, are built on this challenge and while facing this challenge organizations 
always impact at least one of the three principles (Harris, 2000). Economic sustainability 
highlights the balance between the economic system and an organization’s production, 
governmental expenditure, or customer’s consumption, among other aspects. Environmental 
sustainability implies the maintenance of a stable and balanced ecosystem as well as the 
prevention of overexploitation of natural and renewable resources. Social sustainability 
includes distributional equality and reasonable provision of different social services, e.g. 
healthcare and education, as well as gender equality, political accountability, and participation 
and other basic human rights. Hence, moving toward sustainable development encompasses 
the consideration of each principle. (Hart & Milstein, 2003). 
However, even if each principle is approached within the described process, sustainability 
itself is a more complex and multi-dimensional concept that cannot be addressed by a single 
corporate action. As organizations are forced to act on several levels, Hart and Milstein 
(2003) introduced four sets of drivers that should be addressed by any organization in order to 
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create and incorporate sustainability. The first set is related to the reduction of pollution and 
material consumption associated with increasing industrialization. The second set contributes 
to value creation through transparency and responsiveness, driven by civil society 
stakeholders. The third set is related to the development of new, disrupting technologies that 
replace existing ones and, thus, reduce the size of the ecological footprint. The last set 
contributes to an organization’s value creation by meeting the needs of humans at the bottom 
of the world income pyramid in a manner that supports inclusive wealth creation and 
distribution (Hart & Milstein, 2003).  
2.4 Correlation of Resilience and Sustainability 
The previous subchapters outlined the current state of research concerning shocks and 
innovations, resilience, and sustainability. Unpredictable shocks and disruptive innovations 
can directly affect an organization’s ability to conduct its core business. Consequently and as 
outlined previously, an organization’s ability to be resilient is a growing area of interest not 
only within operation management, but also in other fields. First, the statement that “business 
cannot succeed on a planet that fails” (Winston, 2014, p. 59) indicates the critical 
fundamental relationship between sustainability and resilience. Any organization, despite its 
size or productivity, is not able to succeed in the long term, if the ecological environment no 
longer exists. Even though this statement does not yet directly determine a potential effect of 
sustainability on resilience, it builds the foundation of this subchapter’s aim as it first implies 
that resilience cannot exist without sustainability. Second, as described in subchapter 2.3, the 
term “resilience” has its origin in the field of ecology and was first interpreted and 
communicated by Holling (1973) in his work “Resilience and Stability of Ecological 
Systems”. Holling (1973) defined resilience as the ability of a system to absorb disturbances 
or changes in the ecological system.  
Moreover, engaging in environmental sustainability can reduce disturbances or changes in the 
natural environment and ecological system. This recognition again initially links 
sustainability to resilience and, moreover, provides the first evidence of a potential influence 
of sustainability on (ecological) resilience. Environmental sustainability and the usage of 
resources are related as disruptive ecological shocks that can have an effect on the supply of 
renewable resources, such as crops. Winston (2014) pointed out that organizations investing 
in fewer and alternative resources will eventually be more competitive as it can be assumed 
that the respective organizations will become less affected by disruptive ecological shocks. 
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By making improvements in operational efficiency, such as by reducing evitable waste of 
material, organizations become more flexible and competitive (Winston, 2014).  
Building on the subject area of environmental sustainability, a global survey conducted by Mc 
Kinsey revealed that consumers are influenced by organizations’ approaches to environmental 
problems and climate change. More specifically, the approach not only affects the degree of 
customer trust but also whether consumers would actually make a specific purchase decision 
(Bonini, Hintz, & Mendonca, 2008). Furthermore, as more customers become aware of and 
show increasing interest in environmental circumstances, expectations, requirements, and 
needs change. According to De Geus (2002) an organization’s sensitivity toward the 
environment contributes to its longevity. By implication, one could consequently assume that 
investing in environmental sustainability, and thus addressing customers’ changing needs 
toward sustainability, might lead to or increase an organization’s resilience. Moreover, since 
relying on sustainable resources and preventing the overexploitation of natural resources are 
part of environmental sustainability, the validity of the previously made assumption appears 
to be reinforced. 
However, fulfilling customers’ adjusted and changing needs is possible only if an 
organization’s engagement in environmental sustainability is transparently communicated. 
Information technologies and the previously described global connectedness can potentially 
make an organization’s engagements, but also non-existent engagements, visible and 
appraisable. The Internet, social media networks, and consumer protection organizations 
increase the general level of awareness and enable consumers to be informed about a product 
or the manufacturing process with decreasing research effort (Winston, 2014). By 
transparently disclosing product origins, including materials and manufacturing conditions, an 
organization can gain its customers’ trust and improve its chances of resiliency in a situation 
where the economic environment changes might improve (Hart & Milstein, 2003).  
However, some aspects of transparency are also applicable to social sustainability. De Geus 
(2002) noted, “The amount that people care, trust and engage themselves at work has not 
only a direct effect on the bottom line, but the most direct effect of a factor on your company´s 
expected lifespan” (p. 10). This statement claims that involving people in organizational 
development, such as investing in employees and building an internal community of 
corporative people, is an additional factor that can support resilience. Sheffi and Rice Jr 
(2005) supported this opinion and referred to the importance of organizational culture and 
employee empowerment to increase resilience. McKinsey explained that firms that improve 
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their employees’ benefits and conditions can increase their reputation and improve their 
customers’ willingness to purchase their products (Bonini et al., 2008). The findings revealed 
that these changes arise not only because costumers value the appropriate treatment of 
employees, but also because satisfied, motivated, and well-trained employees are assumed to 
provide better products and services. Therefore, ongoing investment in employee 
development, including education and healthcare, builds social sustainability, which in turn 
might lead to increased customer satisfaction and the chances of resilience in case of a 
changing market environment. As most aspects of social sustainability are relatively detached 
from the purchased product or service, costumers might not be able to recognize an 
organization’s potential investment in this principle of sustainability, resulting in a need to 
emphasize transparency. 
In conclusion, De Geus (2002) claimed that organizations that co-exist sensitively with the 
environment are better prepared to cope with shocks or changes in the economic environment. 
More specifically, previous studies have found that the detected correlations between 
sustainability and resilience rest on the three principles of sustainability described in 
subchapter 2.3 (Hart & Milstein, 2003). The assumption that “business cannot succeed on a 
planet that fails” (Winston, 2014, p. 59) and the basic theory as well as the origin of 
economic resilience within the field of ecology present the first link between the general 
concepts of sustainability and resilience within this subchapter. The organizational aspect of 
resources linked to environmental sustainability showed not only another association between 
the two concepts, but also a first potential explicit influence of sustainability on resilience. 
Transparency as an aspect of environmental and social sustainability presents an additional 
correlation and another potential influence of sustainability on resilience.  
As outlined in previous subchapters, the relationship between sustainability and resilience, 
and more precisely how sustainability affects resilience, has not been investigated extensively 
in existing theory. Significantly, no existing theory offers feasible answers to this issue. 
Current research has mainly addressed the relationship between sustainability and 
performance. By contrasting the detected links between sustainability and resilience with the 
absence of academic theory on this relationship, a need for a new and better theory was 
identified. Thus, this study’s aim to build theory on how sustainability relates to resilience 
depends on the practical relevance of this investigation. Building upon this chapter’s outline 
of the theoretical principles chapter 3 introduces this study’s industry context, namely the 
luxury watchmaking industry in Switzerland. 
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3 Industry Context  
As mentioned previously, the aim of this study is to determine how sustainability relates to 
organizations’ resilience, particularly with regard to disruptive innovations or other types of 
industry shocks. Moreover, the previous subchapter detected the general existence of a 
relation between sustainability and resilience from an academic perspective. In order to 
accomplish this study’s necessary practical reference, the theoretical background is applied to 
a specific industry. The Swiss watch manufacturing industry was selected for this study 
because it was struck by and survived a disruptive innovation as well as an industry shock 
within the last 50 years. Furthermore, the intensive usage of scarce metals and gemstones 
could be considered contrary to the concept of sustainability, which makes this industry even 
more attractive for this study. This chapter begins with a detailed introduction to the selection 
of the industry. Subsequently, subchapter 3.3 presents this study’s sample concerning the two 
organizations that were selected as objects of investigation. Finally, this chapter concludes 
with the disruptive innovation and shock that confronted the industry. 
3.1 The Swiss Watchmaking Industry 
The tradition of the Swiss watchmaking craft dates back to the 16th century. In the late 1960s, 
Switzerland dominated the global watch industry with 65% of the world market share and 
over 80% of the respective profits. This success was mostly built on the characteristics of 
Swiss craftsmanship and the accuracy of the watches’ mechanical movement (Tajeddini & 
Mueller, 2012). This dominance almost evaporated in the 1970s when corporations such as 
the Japanese firm Seiko and the US company Timex offered watches that utilized the newly 
developed quartz technology at considerably lower prices (Glasmeier, 1991). This event was 
given the title the “The Quartz Crisis” (Barrett, 2000). However, due to structural changes in 
the Swiss watchmaking industry, which will be outlined more specifically in subchapter 3.2, 
as well as the focus on high-end mechanical watches, Switzerland was able to achieve an 
impressive comeback within the last 30 years (Credit Suisse, 2013).  
Today, China and Switzerland dominate the global watch market. While most Swiss watches 
are positioned in the high-end or luxury segment, Chinese watches are generally positioned in 
the lower end of the price range. Consequently, China is leading in terms of volume and 
exported approximately 634.4 million wristwatches in 2013. In contrast, the Swiss watch 
industry exported approximately 28.1 million units within the same time period. Due to 
Switzerland’s focus on luxury watches, those exported units resulted in the generation of 
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approximately USD 23.6 billion in revenue, while China generated merely approximately 
USD 5.6 billion in revenue with exports of approximately 634.4 million watches. In 
conclusion, with a market value close to 100%, Switzerland enjoys a near-monopoly position 
in the global luxury watch segment (Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry, 2014). 
Consequently, the supremacy of the Swiss watchmaking industry identifies its economic 
relevance in the industry investigated in this study. Based on the dominance of luxury 
watches, the Swiss luxury watchmaking industry was chosen for this study.  
3.2 The Swiss Luxury Watch Industry  
Before introducing the Swiss luxury watch market, the term “luxury” has to be clarified. The 
following table distinguishes four different segments: exclusive luxury, accessible luxury, 
mid-price, and low price. 
Figure 1: Positioning of Swiss watch brands (Pictet, 2003) 
In general, luxury watches are defined as those types/models with a retail price of over 
EUR 1,000. This segment is differentiated by the subsections “exclusive luxury” and 
“accessible luxury.” Accessible luxury watches are defined as those that are sold for retail 
prices between EUR 1,000 and EUR 6,000. The technologies used are mainly based on 
mechanical movements and to a lesser extent quartz movements. The exclusive luxury 
segment, on the other hand, represents watches with a retail price in excess of EUR 6,000 
with no upper limit given. The production of the latter involves demanding craftsmanship and 
processed technologies that are generally based on premium mechanical movements (Pictet, 
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2003). In order to avoid a lack of conceptual clarity, this study’s wording of “Swiss luxury 
watch industry” includes both the exclusive and the accessible luxury segments.  
The success of the Swiss watchmaking industry over the last decades can be attributed 
particularly to structural changes within the industry and a refocus on luxury watches. The 
change started in the middle of the 1990s with the distribution of new electronic 
communication devices such as computers and cell phones. These new electronic devices 
indicated the time more precisely than former (mechanical) watches. As a result, the 
relevance of watches as timekeepers became increasingly insignificant. The Swiss 
watchmaking industry detected this change of thinking relatively early and rested a respective 
reaction on the reinforcement of the symbolic and emotional product aspects (e.g. aesthetics, 
technical know-how, or brand reputation). Additionally, the reinforcement enhanced watches’ 
economic, cultural, and particularly social status. In particular, mechanical watches turned 
into prestige and luxury items and status symbols over time, as they could easily be related to 
tradition, craftsmanship, and uniqueness (Credit Suisse, 2013). 
The industry’s structural changes are reflected in the number of watch exports as well as the 
economics of the luxury watchmaking industry. In unit terms, the Swiss watchmaking 
industry currently exports around 25% fewer watches than two decades ago. However, the 
respective exported watches carry a significantly higher value than two decades ago. 
Accordingly, the average export price of a Swiss watch increased from CHF 160 in 1992 to 
CHF 690 in 2012. The reasons for that adjustment within the last 20 years are various. Every 
fourth watch currently exported from Switzerland includes a mechanical movement, whereas 
this share was less than 10% in the beginning of the 1990s. It could be assumed that the 
significant price increase of approximately 430% is largely due to the growing interest in 
mechanical watches. Moreover, mechanical watches tend to be more expensive compared to 
quartz watches due to a more complex technology and required expertise involved in the 
development and manufacturing process (Credit Suisse, 2013). Finally, the application of 
scarce materials depicts considerable value improving aspects as well (Cheuvreux, 2012). In 
summary, the craftsmanship as well as the use of high-quality materials has led mechanical 
watches to become a luxury item and status symbol, which in turn has led to an increase in 
prices over time (Credit Suisse, 2013). Although Switzerland dominates the luxury watch 
segment worldwide, the mid- and lower end price segments also contribute to the Swiss watch 
industry’s success. Even though watches in this price segment account for only 13% of export 
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sales, this price segment generates more than 80% of the export value of the Swiss 
watchmaking industry.  
The high export volume from the low- and mid price segments contribute to the luxury 
watchmaking industry by creating a high degree of visibility for “Swiss Made” manufacturing 
worldwide. For a watch to bear the “Swiss Made” label, 60% of its manufacturing costs have 
to be incurred in Switzerland (Deloitte, 2013). The label is associated with high quality and 
luxury as well as exclusivity, reliability, and modernity. The quality and reputation of Swiss 
watches are the basis of the successful export economy and serve as an important marketing 
tool (Credit Suisse, 2013). Over the last decade, Swiss watch exports have grown at an 
average annual rate of 7.2%, which is significantly faster than all other Swiss industrial 
exports together. After the pharmaceuticals and machinery industry, the watchmaking 
industry presents Switzerland’s third largest export. Over the years, “Swiss Made” has 
become a valuable trademark that is associated with high quality and luxury (Credit Suisse, 
2013). François Thiebaud, head of Swatch Group brands Tissot, Certina, and Mido, noted “If 
a client learns that French Bordeaux contains Chilean wine, he will feel cheated because the 
designation of origin will not match anything at all. For the Swiss made, it is the 
same”(Cheuvreux, 2012, p. 46). This comparison illustrates the importance of the “Swiss 
Made” label for every watchmaking company in Switzerland. This label is particularly 
important for the luxury watch industry, as it represents the luxury branch’s main 
characteristics, i.e. quality and luxury. 
Today, three watchmaking companies, Swatch Group, Rolex, and Richemont, dominate the 
Swiss luxury watch market. Even though some market participants might be, from the 
perspective of corporate structure, a group of companies, within this study all portrayed 
companies or groups of companies will be solely referred to as “company/-ies.” Combined, 
the three companies named above account for an estimated 46% of global watch sales. 
Besides Rolex, whose portfolio includes only the brand Rolex itself, other market participants 
are fighting for the acquisition of additional (luxury) brands. During the last fifteen years, 
several companies have increased their existing brand portfolios by taking over smaller, 
independent brands. For example, Swatch Group includes not only “Swatch” but also brands, 
such as Omega, Glashütte Original, Breguet, or Blancpain (Euromonitor, 2014).  
In addition to the evident oligopoly regarding the existing dominant market players, the Swiss 
watchmaking industry depends on one leading supplier in terms of watch components, 
namely Swatch Group. ETA, a producer of watch movements owned by Swatch Group, is 
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responsible for 70% of the Swiss watch movements. In addition, Swatch Group has a 
monopoly on the production of balance springs, which balance and regulate watches. Swatch 
Groups subsidiary Nivarox-FAR produces about 90% of all balance springs processed and 
sold in Switzerland. As a result and given the considerable market share up to 90% on some 
specific watch components, all watch manufacturers are directly or indirectly dependent on 
Swatch Group. Even big brands such as Richemont are obligated to use components produced 
by subsidiaries of Swatch Group (Credit Suisse, 2013). In conclusion, the following 
subchapters build upon the previously described company dominance within the Swiss 
watchmaking industry. However, considering the entire watchmaking industry is virtually 
impossible within the scope of this study. On this basis, a representative sample was utilized, 
which resulted in the consideration of Swatch Group, Rolex, and Richemont, as these three 
are the global leaders in terms of export sales. However, because Rolex is a private company, 
it is not compelled to make its financial statements publicly available. The subsequent lack of 
required data concerning Rolex led to the choice of Swatch Group and Richemont for the case 
study. As a result, the following subchapters briefly introduce Swatch Group’s and 
Richemont’s key financial data as well as company structure. These companies form this 
study’s representative sample and are applied with regard to the required practical relevance. 
3.3 Company Profiles 
As mentioned previously, considering the entire watchmaking industry is virtually impossible 
within the scope of this study. This section briefly introduces the two watchmaking 
companies of the representative sample, namely Swatch Group and Richemont. 
The Pictet Report (2003) outlined that 10 out of 18 brands of Swatch Group are ranged in the 
luxury segment whereas all watches by Richemont are classified as luxury watches. At last, 
even though the companies’ product portfolios differ, this does not imply incomparability of 
the representative sample. Richemont has predominantly focused on jewelry, which accounts 
for approximately half of the company’s revenue, while watch-related revenue accounts for 
approximately 26%. In contrast, Swatch Group’s entire business is related to watch 
manufacturing. As both companies’ shares in the global watch market are relatively similar 
and because both companies’ gross sales are also comparable, this study’s investigation on 
how sustainability and resilience are related can be considered unbiased. Whether or not 
Richemont achieves a similar market share while some parts of the company generate 
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relatively more revenue than the watchmaking department is of little to no relevance for this 
case study. In the following subchapters each company will be examined in more detail.  
3.3.1 Swatch Group 
Swatch Group is currently the world’s largest manufacturer of finished watches in terms of 
retail value. In 2013, the company’s retail value share of the Swiss watch market amounted to 
35.9% (Euromonitor, 2014). The company employs almost 33,600 employees in 39 countries. 
In 2013, gross sales amounted to approximately USD 9.50 bn, which depicts an increase of 
11.52% from 2012 (approximately USD 8.50 bn). The company is highly profitable, earning a 
net profit of approximately USD 2.2 bn in 2013, which corresponds to a 21.39% net profit 
margin (Orbis, 2013). 
Swatch Group is a highly diversified company, owning 18 watch brands from the low-end to 
the luxury segment. The company vertically integrates 13 watch and watch-part 
manufacturing brands. In addition, the company structure encompasses five electronic 
systems companies that support the production of micro-batteries and accurate timing systems 
for sports events, among other functions (The Swatch Group Ltd., 2009). The company’s 
value chain includes the manufacturing of every separate part of the watch including the final 
assembly. This ability is supported by the fact that Swatch Group is also a leading supplier of 
watch parts to most competitors (Euromonitor, 2014). 
Not only is Swatch Group vertically integrated backwards, a new strategic focus promotes 
frontward vertical integration concerning the company’s retail locations. Although most of the 
watches are sold through approximately 15,000 retail stores worldwide, the mono-brand store 
presence is permanently expanding. Swatch Group operates more than 900 Swatch boutiques, 
above 1,000 shop-in-shops, and approximately 140 kiosks. By pursuing this strategy, the 
company tries to expand control over the customer buying experience while gaining 
information in terms of regional customer tastes. Furthermore, absolute authority over in-store 
prices reduces the risk of reputation losses or decreasing price performance ratio based on 
increasing discounts given (Credit Suisse, 2013). 
3.3.2 Richemont 
Richemont employs approximately 27,700 employees worldwide. In 2013, the company’s 
gross sales amounted to approximately USD 8.80 bn, which depicts a price increase of 9.96% 
from 2012 (approximately USD 8.00 bn). Like Swatch Group, Richemont is also highly 
profitable, earning a net profit of approximately USD 2.57 bn in 2013, which corresponds to a 
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19.75% net profit margin. However, these numbers are based on Richemont’s whole group 
sales and profits, including the division’s jewelry, premium accessories, writing instruments, 
and other luxury products (Orbis, 2014). 
Richemont´s watch division encompasses nine different luxury watch brands including one 
joint venture with Ralph Lauren Watch and Jewelry Co. The share of the watchmaking 
division in the group sales accounted for 28% with approximately EUR 2.75 mil. gross sales 
in 2013 (Compagnie Financière Richemont SA, 2014). 
Richemont’s luxury products are sold through a network of shops owned and controlled by 
the company, franchise operations, and shops owned by third parties. The company’s luxury 
businesses operate globally. Richemont’s main market is Europe, which generates around 
40% of sales (Compagnie Financière Richemont SA, 2014). 
3.4 Disruptive Innovation and Shocks in the Swiss Watch Industry 
Building upon the brief introduction of this study’s representative industry sample, this 
subchapter relates the theoretical background with the industry and concludes with the 
previously described events that led to the initial selection of the industry. Resilience 
describes an organization’s ability to cope with industry shocks or market disruptions. In 
order to investigate whether sustainability might influence an organization’s ability to be 
resilient, an industry sample has to be observed in the context of an industry shock or market 
disruption. Therefore, this subchapter briefly outlines two major industry shocks of the last 
several decades, in particular the Quartz Crisis of the 1970s as an example of an innovation 
disrupting the global watch market and the financial crisis in 2007/08 as an illustration of a 
worldwide industry overlapping shock. 
3.4.1 The Quartz Crisis 
Over decades, Swiss companies dominated the global watch industry. This dominance, 
however, almost evaporated in the 1970s when companies such as the Japanese firm Seiko or 
the US-based company Timex offered watches at considerably lower prices that used quartz 
technology (Glasmeier, 1991). Conductive quartz crystals use electronic means in order to 
accurately measure time, while incorporating significantly less moving parts than mechanical 
watches. Moreover, with the advent of the quartz crystals, time could be displayed by 
conventional means (analogue) or by digital display (such as light-emitting diode). With 
enhanced accuracy, quartz watches were also able to integrate other features, like alarms and 
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calculators. The extended degree of functionality of quartz watches as well as the ability to 
produce the respective watches at significantly lower prices depicted a disruptive innovation 
at that time (Glasmeier, 1991). 
As a consequence, the Swiss watch industry lost considerable market share and underwent a 
significant industry reduction (Tajeddini & Mueller, 2012). However, instead of adopting the 
new quartz technology, most Swiss watch manufacturers chose to stick with traditional 
mechanical watches. As watch manufacturers increased prices to compensate shrinking sales, 
the number of consumers preferring reasonably priced quartz watches over relatively 
expensive mechanical watches manufactured in Switzerland increased as well. 
Consequentially, several established firms were forced to exit the market. In particular, the 
extensive Swiss watch manufacturing industry, which encompassed about 1,620 watchmakers 
in the 1970s, declined to around 600 firms in 1985 (Cassia et al., 2006). For the United States 
and Japan, this decade became known as “The Quartz Revolution,” while Switzerland 
referred to this period as “The Quartz Crisis” (Barrett, 2000, p. 362). 
3.4.2 Financial Crisis 
The global financial and economic crisis of 2007/08 is considered the most serious financial 
crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The first stages dated from August 9, 2007, 
when BNP Paribas halted redemptions from three investment funds. A temporary peak was 
later reached when Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks worldwide at that 
time, failed. This single bankruptcy threatened the total breakdown of several other financial 
institutions. Even though the collapse of the entire market was prevented through the bailout 
of several banks by the US government, stock markets’ share prices reflected the resulting 
investor insecurity. Respective effects on the worldwide economy encompassed radically 
declining transaction volumes, customer wealth, and consumer confidence along with 
collapsing housing markets and increasing unemployment. As a result, even if a product-
based organization would hypothetically not have been active on the financial market and 
unconstrained from leverage, the overall economic circumstances decreased sales and 
weakened profit margins. 
Consequently, the financial crisis affected the Swiss watchmaking industry rather indirectly 
as demand declined, especially for luxury products as the respective purchase decision can be 
postponed indefinitely. From 1990 to 2000, the Swiss watchmaking industry had been able to 
almost double its export amounts from approximately CHF 6.8 bn to around CHF 10.3 bn, 
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with an average annual growth rate of about 4.3%. Moreover, between 2000 and 2008, watch 
exports grew by an average annual rate of 6.5%. This stable growth, however, halved as a 
consequence of the global financial crisis in 2007/08, and the watch export rate slowed down 
and then declined from the end of 2008 (-22.3%) (Credit Suisse, 2013, p. 10). 
3.5 Preliminary Industry Results  
As outlined previously, the Quartz Crisis almost eliminated the Swiss watchmaking industry. 
To evoke the turnaround within this crisis, Switzerland’s banks merged the country’s two 
giant (and financially bankrupted) watch manufacturers Société Suisse pour l’Industrie 
Horlogère (SSIH) and Allgemeine Schweizerische Uhrenindustrie AG (ASUAG). After 
assembling a group of investors, Nicholas Hayek became the CEO of the new company 
Société Suisse de Microélectronique et d´ Horlogerie (SMH), which was renamed Swatch 
Group in 1998 (Taylor, 1993). While most Swiss companies were sourcing their 
manufacturing to so-called low-cost countries, Hayek understood the importance of producing 
in Switzerland while incorporating the previously described “Swiss Made” label. In order to 
stay competitive, Hayek incited the engineers to design watches that cost less than 10% in 
direct labor to manufacture. Indeed, Swatch Group was able to innovate its manufacturing 
process to produce watches virtually as cheap as quartz manufacturers while being able to 
brand the watches “Swiss Made.” Among other factors, the “Swiss Made” label became a 
significant characteristic of the company’s survival in the long run (Taylor, 1993). 
Although Switzerland dominated the high-end segment of the industry, the lower-end 
segment was rather neglected. The underestimation of this segment’s potential allowed 
quartz-based competitors to successively increase their market share. In order to manage 
quality, cost, and thus the company’s share in the middle and high-end segment, Hayek 
decided to compete within the low-end segment as well (Taylor, 1993). However, instead of 
simply adopting the quartz innovation, Hayek introduced a new entry-level brand called 
“Swatch” in 1983. Slimming the new model by reducing the amount of components from 
around 150 to 51 lowered manufacturing costs accordingly (Barrett, 2000). As a result, 
Seiko’s and Timex’s quartz price advantage was in effect eliminated. With an increased focus 
on style and design, Swatch Group produced several different styles and models that were 
refreshed semi-annually in order to keep customers excited. The fundamental idea behind 
Swatch was to make a watch so affordable and stylish that people would own more than one; 
indeed, the name “Swatch” stands for “second watch” (Taylor, 1993). 
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The introduction of Swatch revitalized the entire Swiss watchmaking industry. On the one 
hand, the brand restored the Swiss industry’s credibility with the public and re-established the 
Swiss trustworthiness concerning trade (Taylor, 1993). One the other hand, the action 
resuscitated mechanical watches. While Swatch Group took over a global mass-market 
audience with its low-end watch Swatch, other traditional mechanical watch manufacturers 
benefited from Swatch’s success and reinvented themselves as luxury status symbols 
celebrating craft and tradition (Taylor, 1993). In summary, the Swiss watchmaking industry 
turnaround was mostly evoked by a transition from high-end watches to a broader product 
range including low-end watches. The return toward tradition and Swiss craftsmanship, 
combined with a necessary reduction of production costs, led to the overall industry recovery.  
Swatch Group with regard to its legal structure emerged from the Quartz Crisis. Because the 
company did not exist beforehand, it is impossible to investigate which potential measures 
and principles of sustainability might have contributed to the company’s apparent resilience 
and sustainability. A similar situation presents itself concerning Richemont, as the company’s 
legal structure was set up in 1988. Based on these circumstances, this study is confronted with 
a recurring issue within any research-based academic dissertation. On the one hand, due to the 
timeframe of the Quartz Crisis, finding sound and comparable data with regard to the 
companies’ financial statements has proven to be virtually impossible as several companies, 
which are now part of the representative sample, did not make internal documentation 
publicly available during that time period. On the other hand, any strategic documents that 
could serve as basis for further academic investigation regarding which measures the 
companies had taken in order to be resilient are also either not available or available only 
with considerable difficulty that surpassed the available timeframe and scope of this study. 
Given these preliminary results and the timeframe and scope of this study, the global financial 
and economic crisis in 2007/08 will be utilized as the starting point of the conceptual 
framework of this study. The following chapter presents the conceptual framework on which 
the study was based. 
4 Conceptual Framework 
The previous chapters aimed to provide an in-depth background and understanding of the 
theoretical framework in terms of disruptive innovations, resilience, and sustainability. Based 
on this theoretical framework and the detection of various potential correlations, chapter 3 
presented an understanding with regard to this study’s industry focus, namely the luxury 
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watch manufacturing industry in Switzerland. Chapter 4 functions as a transition between the 
previous chapters and the research question. Although an analysis of all detected correlations 
would exceed the scope of this study, two correlations seemed highly relevant with regard to 
this study’s industry. First, (a) organizations that co-exist sensitively with the environment 
(i.e., those that invest in environmental sustainability) might be better prepared to cope with 
shocks or changes in the economic environment. Second, (b) transparency with regard to 
information linked to social and environmental sustainability increases customers’ trust and 
loyalty with an organization, which in turn might enable the company to better cope with 
potential future shocks. Hereinafter, the indicated correlation between sustainability and 
resilience will be applied to this study’s industry and serve as a foundation to the research as 
well as introduce the answer to the proposed research question.  
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
(a) For an organization that creates luxury watches, one of the most significant areas of 
environmental sustainability relates to the usage of scarce metals and gemstones, in particular 
gold and diamonds. These materials are intensively used in the luxury watchmaking industry 
and among other things justify the corresponding price and value of a luxury watch. In 
contrast to these materials’ glamorous appearance, however, the mining operations of gold 
and diamonds are often related to environmental concerns. Diamonds are predominantly 
sourced from developing and emerging countries, such as Russia or some African countries. 
These countries account for around 70% of the world´s diamond production (Bain & 
Company, 2013). Due to media coverage in the 1990s, the industry became increasingly 
associated with terms such as “blood diamonds” or “conflict diamonds.” The term stems from 
the fact that the usage of those diamonds has been proven, for example, to finance civil wars 
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in African countries (Bain & Company, 2013). Similar to diamonds, some gold exports 
originate from African conflict regions. As a result, gold is classified as one of the four 
“conflict minerals” (along with coltan, cassiterite, and wolframite) (Bain & Company, 2013). 
Aside from gold mining operations’ environmental problems, statistically the amount of 
waste per unit is higher in contrast to any other metal (Earthworks & Oxfam America, 2004). 
Based on this information, the luxury watch industry could appear far from being sustainable 
concerning theses scarce materials. Concluding, this chapter’s necessary transition of 
applying the theoretical findings of chapter 2 to the specifically chosen industry was 
successful and thus the foundation for proceeding with the data analysis has been established. 
(b) As luxury watches are categorized as consumer goods, consumers present one of the most 
significant stakeholder groups for watchmaking companies. Chapter 2 outlined that today´s 
consumers increasingly care about social and environmental standards and detailed 
characteristics of purchased products and brands. Customers expect instant access to 
information about the things that are being purchased. By transparently disclosing relevant 
information with regard to aspects of social and environmental sustainability, organizations 
can improve consumers’ trust in the organization and its products. As a result, the degree of 
transparency appears to be directly or indirectly related to potential purchase decisions. Thus, 
it can be assumed that companies that transparently communicate efforts toward 
environmental and social sustainability increase their ability to handle future shocks. 
Still, it could be assumed that the luxury watchmaking industry might not be known for an 
above average degree of transparency regarding sustainability. In particular, the Swiss 
oligopoly industry structure might suppress the impression of actual consumer market power, 
especially since the request for transparency is relatively detached from the product itself. 
Nonetheless, transparency is more than just marketing. Transparency includes the disclosure 
of various data concerning in this case environmental- and social-related information, such as 
specific data about the carbon emission or information about efforts toward employee 
development. Any luxury product manufacturing industry is generally highly dependent upon 
the customers’ desire to purchase, independent from an oligopoly or even monopoly industry 
structure. As the products are relatively expensive, the potential customer group is smaller in 
relation to mass products. Thus, customers’ market power must not be underestimated, and 
applying the theoretical findings of chapter 2 to the chosen industry was successful.  
In conclusion, both, scarce metals and gemstones as well as transparency, have proven to 
constitute an industry-relevant theoretical foundation. Within the subsequent chapter, the 
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research methodology will outline this study’s case study approach to the theoretical 
framework, the selected industry, and the representative industry sample. 
5 Research Methodology 
Before presenting the data and research results this chapter outlines the applied methodology 
used to answer the research question. Subchapter 5.1 explains the applied methodology before 
discussing actual data collection strategies in subchapter 5.2 and subchapter 5.3.  
5.1 Case Study 
Most of the current research on resilience has built on quantitative data with regard to 
moderating variables, such as “financial performance”. However, this study changes the 
moderating variable to “sustainability”, a field that has not been covered adequately so far. 
While hypothesis testing is a good approach to test a theory that is relatively mature and 
detailed, case studies emphasize new research fields by investigating topics or complex 
contemporary phenomena that have been covered poorly or not at all. Given that the topic of 
this study is rather new and not well covered, the approach of conducting a case study is 
justified.  
A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context (…) in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 2014, p. 23). By 
collecting various evidence and information sources, case studies examine a phenomenon 
from multiple perspectives and enable the detection of patterns and potential explanations that 
were initially not expected or researched. The aim of a case study tends to be theory 
development beyond its current emergent state (Blumberg, Cooper, & Schindler, 2005). 
Given the primary focus on resilience and sustainability considered independently from each 
other, this study contributes to existing research by investigating the potential relationship 
between the two. Moreover, the exploratory nature of the case study approach permits the 
examination of data and information while further elaborating theory and concepts throughout 
the entire research process. In short, the case study approach allows for the evaluation of 
theory by answering “Why?” and “How?” questions (Blumberg et al., 2005). 
This research involves a comparative case study in which two Swiss watchmaking companies 
are evaluated. In analyzing these two cases, several sources of evidence are investigated, 
including quantitative data analyses as well as qualitative methods in the form of semi-
structured interviews. The usage of multiple sources allows compensating weaknesses of one 
 24 
approach with strengths of another to form a complete understanding of the investigated 
phenomenon. However, it has to be underlined that the quantitative data does not test the 
qualitative data; rather, they complement each other (Blumberg et al., 2005). Both the 
quantitative and qualitative methods are described hereinafter. 
5.2 Quantitative Data  
The quantitative analysis aims to determine the sustainability performance of Swatch Group 
and Richemont, and to provide an understanding of the firms’ resilience.  
Resilience is measured in terms of the relative stabilization of the share price of each 
organization after the financial crisis in 2007/08. As resilience is defined as the ability to 
return to equilibrium after a disruption (Tilman & Downing, 1996), the return of a share price 
to a pre-crisis value can provide evidence and traceability of the organizations’ resilience. A 
share price represents the cost of purchasing a security on an exchange and can be affected by 
several aspects, such as market volatility, economic conditions, and the organization’s 
popularity. Hence, a share price represents an indicator or how a market shock, such as the 
financial crisis, usually impacts a company. Richemont’s and Swatch Group’s share prices 
were retrieved from the SIX Swiss Exchange’s website. The observation of the share prices 
covers the period from 2007 to 2010. The first measurement was retrieved from August 8, 
2007, one day before the official beginning of the active phase of the financial crisis. In 
addition, the date and the share price when the companies reached the pre-crisis level 
(equilibrium) were identified and the time span (in weeks) from the advent of the financial 
crisis until the return to the pre-crisis level was calculated. Furthermore, the date and share 
price of each organization’s peak was identified and the number of weeks from the peak until 
the return to the pre-crisis level was calculated. The observation of the return to the pre-crisis 
point allows for the proof of resilience, whereas the time span to reach the pre-crisis level 
provides a better understanding of each firm’s level of resilience relative to each other.  
A thorough analysis of the organizations’ annual reports of the period from 2005 to 2010 was 
conducted as a means of discovering and determining sustainability-related activities and 
investments done in the years prior to and after the financial crisis. Swatch Group’s and 
Richemont’s report data were used because it depicts the most detailed data available on the 
investigated issues. Additionally, the annual reports guarantee the most stable reporting 
throughout the years, which relieves the intra- and inter-company comparison over time. The 
reports were retrieved from the “Investor Relations” sections of the respective company 
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websites. During the period of review, neither of the organizations published a corporate 
social responsibility report (or any similar report). Therefore, a thorough analysis of the 
“Environmental and Social Policy” section (Swatch Group) and the “Corporate 
Responsibility” section (Richemont) of the respective annual reports were conducted.  
One way to measure sustainability is to compile and compare data of organizational 
sustainability expenditures (GRI–Global Reporting Initiative, 2006). However, neither 
Richemont nor Swatch Group published data with regard to these expenditures. Thus, other 
sustainability measurements related to the study’s correlations within subchapter 2.4 were 
sought. With regard to the “Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” by Global Reporting 
Initiative, core measurements were selected that allowed to draw a conclusion about both 
companies’ levels of sustainability (GRI–Global Reporting Initiative, 2006). 
Table 1: Overview of sustainability measurements 
The first two measurements in the above overview are related to scarce metals and gemstones. 
The process from mining to retailing involves several different stakeholders. Environmental 
issues, corruption, and poor working conditions present the main concerns involved in this 
process. Because only officially sanctioned initiatives guarantee a basic traceability for scarce 
metals and gemstones, the number of memberships in these initiatives as well as the duration 
of these memberships serve as a measurement for this study. As only officially sanctioned 
initiatives are taken into account, the number of initiatives provides evidence for the 
awareness and level of involvement in environmental issues. Furthermore, the membership 
duration was measured to derive potential connections with the financial crisis as well as to 
provide further evidence for the level of each organization’s involvement. All other 
measurements in table 1 are linked to transparency and aim to build evidence for the level of 
each organization’s transparency with regard to reported information about social and 
environmental sustainability. Environmental measurements cover performance related to 
inputs, such as energy, and outputs, such as emissions. Social measurements are related to the 
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impacts an organization may have on the social system in which it operates, including the 
impact on employees and the local community. All these measurements present data that 
extends the legal reporting and furthermore concerns the content linked to sustainability. The 
annual reports were reviewed in terms of the amount of presented data related to each 
measurement and in terms of the accuracy and traceability of the data.  
5.3 Qualitative Data 
Complementary to the gathered quantitative data, interviews were conducted to get a 
professional opinion on the topic of interest. In total, eight interviews were conducted over a 
span of four weeks, most lasting between 45 and 90 minutes. Six out of the eight interviews 
were conducted face-to-face in comfortable environments such as conference rooms that were 
relatively free from distraction. Due to scheduling difficulties, the remaining two interviews 
were conducted by telephone. Regardless of the format, each interview was semi-structured. 
Semi-structured interviews aim to discover the perspective of the interviewee on a specific 
issue and are thus able to confirm the findings detected in the quantitative analysis. By 
creating an interactive dialogue, a semi-structured interviews allow additional questions and 
ideas to arise during the interview as a result of the interviewee’s statements (Blumberg et al., 
2005). To focus on the intended topic and in order to ensure continuity across the various 
interviews, a structured framework of subjects and specific questions was used. This 
framework ensured the discussion of the identical topic in each interview, while allowing for 
individual follow-up questions. In order to limit potential bias, several knowledgeable 
interviewees who viewed the topic of interest from diverse perspectives were selected 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Apart from preventing potential bias, conducting interviews 
with multiple stakeholders and viewpoints allowed a 360-degree view of the topic, which 
contributed to the formation of theory and the provision of evidence for this study. Thus, the 
interviewees included organizational actors from Richemont and Swatch Group, actors from 
an interest group (Amnesty International), and customers of luxury watches.  
On the organizational level, two respondents, one from each company, were approached and 
willing to conduct an interview for this study. As mentioned in subchapter 3.3, these 
companies were chosen with regard to their leading positions within the luxury watchmaking 
industry in Switzerland. The purpose of the interviews was to gain a better understanding of 
the influential factors of organizational resilience and, moreover, to explore the motivations of 
efforts with regard to sustainability, observed within the quantitative data analysis. In order to 
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avoid any potential influence beforehand, the interview requests related to this interview 
group contained only the information that the case study aimed to explore: how companies 
deal with different kinds of shocks. During the interviews, the interviewees were asked what 
the respective company had done with regard to the financial crisis in 2007/08 and how they 
evaluate these measures in terms of their effectiveness. Specific questions concerning the 
topics of sustainability and resilience were not asked to avoid any influence of the responses 
and to obtain open to any information which might not have been considered or expected.  
Both interviewees had to deal with organizational constraints with regard to confidentiality. 
Therefore, the main challenge in gathering qualitative data was to maintain the interviewees’ 
confidentiality while presenting rich, detailed organizational data. The approach applied in 
this study was built on suggestions developed by Kaiser (2009). At the beginning of the data 
collection process before the interviews were conducted, both parties agreed on the terms and 
conditions regarding the publication of the respective data. Based on these confidentiality 
agreements, the interview data were “cleaned” by removing all identifying details, such as 
company names. However, although personal identifying details can be removed easily, 
contextual identifying details, such as special events, which can only be linked to one 
company, will remain. This challenge is particularly daunting in this comparative case study, 
in which only two companies are compared and contrasted. Thus, even without stating the 
name of the company or interviewee, readers might be able to identify the organization 
according to the statements of the (anonymized) interviewee. To deal with this problem, one 
can change specific details to render data unidentifiable (Kaiser, 2009). However, unlike 
changing the name of the company or an interviewee, changing additional details can modify 
or even destroy the original meaning of the data. Therefore, the gathered interview data was 
detached and reviewed by the interviewee, and only data released by the interviewee was used 
and indicated in subchapter 6.2 of this study. All other data was not published to avoid 
harming the confidentiality agreement. 
As this study assumes that scarce metals and gemstones represent a particular issue in terms 
of environmental sustainability of companies that manufacture luxury watches, an interview 
with an interest group was conducted. The aim of this interview was to get a professional 
opinion of the particular issues and to gain an understanding of the effectiveness of various 
supporting measures and actions taken by the companies. The selection of the organization 
followed the requirements of the theoretical sampling method, which selects elements based 
on their particular suitability “for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among 
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constructs” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27). Amnesty International is an international, 
non-governmental organization. Compared to other interest groups or non-governmental 
organizations, such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International has maintained a primary interest 
in conflict metals and gemstone. Over the last two decades, Amnesty International regularly 
tried to increase awareness for the conflicts accompanying and involved within the sourcing 
process of conflict metals and diamonds. For example, in 2004, they published a brochure that 
enlightened customers and provided customers support to purchase products whose gold and 
diamonds did not fund any conflicts. However, the aim of this brochure was not only to 
enlighten and support customers, but also to force producers and retailers to implement a 
system of guarantees that ensured that suppliers dealt only in conflict-free diamonds and gold. 
Another, more recent example is represented by the report “Mining and Human Rights in 
Senegal: Closing the Gaps in Protection,” published in May 2014 by Amnesty International. 
This report informs readers about conflict gold and aims to shed light on the still existing 
conflict. Based the constant actions taken by Amnesty International to support conflict-free 
gold and diamonds, the organization is assumed to be highly knowledgeable and thus able to 
offer further insight into the underlying issue. Therefore, a volunteer from Amnesty 
International was interviewed to gain deeper theoretical insights.  
At last, as watches generally represent a consumer good, it seems logical to also consider the 
customer perspective. These interviews aimed to gain an idea about the consumers’ purchase 
decision process of a luxury watch and about potential awareness and interest in terms of 
sustainability linked to luxury watches (Appendix A). The selection of the consumer 
interviewees was based on the convenience sampling method was used, as it is appropriate to 
test or gain ideas about the subject of interest. Convenience samples are non-probability 
samples and unrestricted (Blumberg et al., 2005). More specifically, interviewees were 
selected based on the criteria of owning at least one luxury watch, i.e. a watch with a selling 
price above EUR 1,000. In total, five personal interviews were conducted, most lasting 
between 30 and 45 minutes. This total number of customer interviews is related to the 
theoretical saturation of the category, meaning the point where “gathering fresh data no 
longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of these core theoretical 
categories” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 113). As the fourth and fifth customer interview did not 
provide additional insights, no further interviews were conducted. 
In order to compile, organize, and make sense of the interview data, all interview data was 
coded. Coding describes “segments of data with a short name that simultaneously summarizes 
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and accounts for each piece of data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 43). The aim of coding is to cover 
similar themes in several interviews or in different parts of one interview in order to compare 
interviews as well as to get an appropriate understanding of what the interviewees have said 
about different themes (Rowley, 2012). Hence, it builds the pivotal link between the data 
collection and the actual explanation of the data. Before the initial coding process started, 
preliminary deductive coding was applied to one already conducted interview. As this coding 
process generated an unsatisfying outcome and was difficult to apply to the different groups 
of interviewees, the analysis of the qualitative interview data builds on inductive coding, more 
precisely the inductive coding process described by Creswell (2002). According to Creswell 
(2002), theory develops “from the particular or the detailed data to the general codes and 
themes,” i.e. inductive theory building (p. 238).  
Figure 3: A visual model of the coding process by Creswell (2002) 
As visualized in figure 3, the coding process included five major steps. The first step 
consisted of becoming familiar with the interview data to gain an understanding of all themes 
covered in the interview. This step began the process of thinking about key themes of the 
interviews. Therefore, all interviews were thoroughly read and the first annotations for key 
items were made. In the next step, the interview data was divided into several segments by 
considering the underlying meaning and reflecting on single ideas or concepts of what the 
interviewee said in each sentence or group of sentences. The third step started the actual 
coding process by assigning code words or phrases that accurately reflected the idea or 
concept to each segment. The next step consisted of reducing overlapping codes, by grouping 
similar codes and looking for redundant codes. Afterward, the interviews were coded again, 
based on the codes of the new, reduced code list, to see whether new codes emerged. The last 
step involved a further reduction of codes into themes or descriptions of the interview data. 
These themes were built on “similar codes aggregated together to form a major idea in the 
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database” (Creswell, 2002, p. 245). The finalized themes present the areas in which insights 
have been generated and build the foundation for the narratives in the data chapter 6. 
Because the interviews of the three interview groups (i.e. employees, interest group, and 
consumers) had a different purposes, each had a different question framework with various 
spcific questions related to the issue of interest. Therefore, the interviews of the respective 
interview groups were coded separately to ensure a reflective coding outcome. The actual 
coding process of the interviews with the organizational actors identified 261 codes, which 
were combined and reduced into 23 abstract codes. Based on these reduced codes, two main 
themes were detected: (a) measures to deal with the financial crisis, and (b) measures to deal 
with future shocks. The coding process of the interview with Amnesty International identified 
42 codes, which were further reduced to 6 abstract codes, and finally, to one theme: 
importance of scarce gemstones. The coding process of the consumer interviews identified 
145 codes that were combined and reduced to 16 abstract codes. Afterwards, the combined 
codes were ultimately organized into four central themes: (a) reason for the purchase, (b) 
criteria that positively influence the purchase of a luxury watch, (c) criteria that negatively 
influence the purchase of a luxury watch, and (d) interest in the production process.  
The entire coding process was supported by the qualitative analysis tool “MAXQDA,” which 
allows for organizing and classifying large quantities of raw data and developed codes. To 
reduce potential bias in interpretation another researcher was invited to check the 
classification and coding of the interview data. As all interviews were conducted in German, 
the entire coding procedure was also conducted in German. After completing the coding 
process, the finalized themes were translated into English. Again, in order to reduce bias in 
the translation, a translator was invited to review the translation of the themes into English.  
After having outlined the research methodology, the following chapter 6 will introduce the 
quantitative and qualitative data gathered from this study´s investigation. 
6 Data 
Chapter 5 outlined the applied methodology as well as the data gathering- and data evaluation 
processes of this study. It was initially necessary to determine whether both organizations of 
this study’s representative sample were indeed resilient with regard to the advent of the 
financial crisis in 2007/08. For this purpose, the first part of this chapter analyzes Swatch 
Group’s and Richemont’s ability to recover from shocks based on quantitative data collection, 
i.e. the respective share price development. Once conclusions about the resilience of each 
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organization will have been made, an analysis of the potential relation of sustainability and 
resilience is conducted based on qualitative data and qualitative data. 
6.1 Analysis of Quantitative Data 
Quantitative data builds on share price related analysis and thus publicly available financial 
data as well as findings extracted from the companies’ annual reports (financial years 2005–
2010). As outlined in subchapter 5.2, the detected sustainability measures and the analysis of 
their existence within the quantitative data gathered provides a first understanding of the 
companies’ sustainability efforts toward transparency and handling of scarce metals and 
gemstones. Subsequent to the analysis of share price development on resilience in subchapter 
6.1.1, subchapter 6.1.2 presents data that reveals whether supporting ethical and sustainable 
sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones, i.e. environmental sustainability, may have an effect 
on organizations’ resilience. Chapter 6.1.3 discovers whether transparency with regard to 
social sustainability enables organizations to better cope with shocks and to be resilient. 
6.1.1 Analysis of Share Price Development on Resilience 
The main shock that the luxury watchmaking industry faced in the last decades was the global 
financial crisis in 2007/08. By analyzing the development of the respective share prices, this 
subchapter draws a conclusion regarding how Richemont and Swatch Group were affected by 
and coped with the crisis from an economic and financial perspective. Figure 4 below 
illustrates the share price development of Richemont and Swatch Group scaled by percent 
between August 2007 and December 2010. Scaling share prices by percent has the advantage 
that the overall performance can be identified on a percentage basis, starting at 100% at the 
point in time of the observation’s start. This illustration is especially useful when comparing 
two or more absolute stock prices, which would otherwise be not comparable as, for example. 
the shares’ starting price already might have been different and thus a comparison of absolute 
numbers would provide no added value academically. 
Figure 4: Share prices of Richemont (CFR) and Swatch Group (UHR) (2007–2010) 
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The red line (UHR) represents the share price development of Swatch Group, while the blue 
line (CFR) represents Richemont’s share price development. The data analysis started on 
August 8, 2007, one day before the official beginning of the financial crisis, dated on August 
9, 2007. As described earlier, share prices’ development is set to 100% at this date. The graph 
makes underlines that both organizations reacted analogically to the general course of the 
financial crisis. More specifically, both companies’ share price experienced a strong slow 
down until the beginning of 2009 and a slow recovery from the beginning till the end of 2010. 
The turn of the year 2010 marks the point of recovery as Richemont’s share price surpasses 
the previously set start point of 100% shortly before, Swatch Group’s share price 
development follows with a slight delay of approx. 2-4 months. However, even more striking 
and of increased relevance for this study’s investigation is the similarity of both companies’ 
share price development towards each other. As highlighted in Figure 4, both circles 
underline both relative share price developments’ similarity with regard to slight changes up- 
as well as downward. As announcements in the respective investors’ relations’ sections did 
not shed light on this development, especially regarding similarity, it can be assumed that this 
share price development suggests a generally homogenous market. This assumption is 
underlined by comparing this observation with the share price development of LVMH, the 
next biggest public Swiss watchmaking company. It appears that the industry is well-balanced 
as all shares of the compared companies move similarly  
Table 2: Highlights of share prices during the financial crisis (Richemont; Swatch Group) 
Besides the share prices on August 8, 2007, Table 2 displays the dates and share prices of the 
companies’ share price development bottom and equilibrium, i.e. the point they reached the 
pre-crisis level again. Surprisingly, both companies’ share price development reached the 
bottom within the same week, i.e. March 2-6, 2009. As already indicated by the graph in 
Figure 4, Swatch Group recovered to its pre-crisis level in the week from March 22 to 26, 
2010, i.e. 137 weeks after reaching the all time low within the selected time period. In 
contrast, Richemont returned to its pre-crisis point in the week from November 23 to 27, i.e. 
120 weeks and therefore 17 weeks earlier than Swatch Group. Similarly, the period between 
bottom and equilibrium amounted to 55 weeks for Swatch Group and 38 weeks for 
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Richemont. At last, the share price of Swatch Group fell in total by 63.41%, while 
Richemont’s share price fell only by 55.49%.  
The results from the analysis show that both companies were able to recover, i.e. return to 
their pre-crisis points, after they were affected by the financial crisis in 2007/08. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the financial data determined that, based on the finding of when pre-crisis 
stock level was reached, how steep the decline has been for each company, Richemont had a 
tendency to better cope with the financial crisis than Swatch Group. In order to determine 
whether this finding is related to both companies’ activities concerning sustainability, an 
analysis of the companies’ sustainability-related activities and investments was conducted 
subsequently. 
6.1.2 Analysis of Measures Towards Environmental Sustainability 
For a company that manufacturing luxury watches using scarce metals and gemstones, one of 
the most significant areas with relevance to environmental sustainability is the ethical and 
sustainable sourcing of gold and diamonds. This subchapter presents quantitative data 
gathered from Richemont’s and Swatch Group’s annual reports within the time period of 
2005 to 2010, more specifically the information that is related to dealing with scarce metals 
and gemstones. As mentioned in chapter 5.2, detected sustainability measurements 
concerning circumstances related to scarce metals and gemstones are (1) the number of 
memberships in officially sanctioned initiatives regarding the proper dealing of scarce metals 
and gemstones as well as (2) the duration of memberships within these initiatives. With 
regard to these measures, the data presented within the annual reports is presented hereinafter. 
 (1) Number of memberships in officially sanctioned initiatives 
Richemont is involved in three different initiatives that are concerned with the ethical and 
sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones: (a) the Responsible Jewelry Council 
(RJC), (b) the Kimberly Process, and (c) the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES).  
(a) The RJC was established in May 2005. Cartier, one of Richemont’s leading brands, is a 
founding member of the RJC. The council is a voluntary initiative, whose participants are 
committed to the promotion of responsible business practices across the diamond and gold 
sourcing supply chain. More precisely, all participants implement procedures that ensure that 
gold and diamonds entering the supply chain have been sourced without harming the 
environment or the community in which the sourcing has taken place. To understand the 
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controls of the different steps within the sourcing process of metals and gemstones, 
“Richemont has taken steps to review the processes being implemented by […] meeting with 
gold refiners and banks, which supply the bulk of the gold used in our jewelry and 
watchmaking processes” (Compagnie Financière Richemont SA, 2011, p. 53). 
(b) The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requires all rough diamond exports and 
imports of participating countries to be documented, uniquely certified and approved via a 
government bureau, in order to support conflict-free diamonds. In addition, Richemont 
requires all its suppliers to comply with the “System of Warranties,” a continuation of the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. This voluntary system relies on the creation of a 
chain of written warranties from original Kimberley Process certificates to invoices of all 
different transactions involving the purchase and sale of diamonds as well as their cutting and 
polishing.  
(c) CITES is related to the procurement, import, usage, and export of leather and other raw 
materials issued from endangered or protected species. 
In contrast to Richemont, Swatch Group is committed only to the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. Specifically, Swatch Group’s diamond trade is entirely compatible with 
the Kimberly Process regulations.  
 (2) Duration of memberships in officially sanctioned initiatives 
In 2005, Cartier, one of Richemont’s leading brands, co-founded the RJC. Within 2005 and 
2010, other Richemont Group companies, such as Van Cleef & Arpels, Piaget, and Montblanc 
joined the RJC. Since 2006, all diamonds used by Richemont’s companies are Kimberly 
Process compliant. The 2008 annual report contained the first reference to CITES, yet it is not 
clearly stated when the company began to apply the procedures and regulations of the 
respective initiative. In 2010, Swatch Group first reported its policy regarding suppliers and 
the sourcing of raw and scarce materials. However, the annual report does not indicate when 
the company began following the Kimberly Process regulations. 
6.1.3 Analysis of Measures Towards Social Sustainability 
Similar to subchapter 6.1.2, the quantitative data presented in this chapter was collected from 
Richemont’s and Swatch Group’s annual reports from 2005 to 2010. Data related to the years 
after 2010 were not included. To ensure a better understanding and in order to provide a 
comprehensive overview, the gathered data is presented with regard to (social) sustainability 
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measurements related to transparency: (1) location of production, (2) amount of water 
consumption, (3) amount of waste, (4) amount of carbon emission, (5) amount of energy 
consumption, (6) number of initiatives toward employee training and development, (7) 
employee training and development expenditures, (8) number of supported community 
projects, and (9) community expenditures. As mentioned in chapter 5.2, these measurements 
aim to build an understanding of the degree of transparency with regard to sustainability 
efforts by Richemont and Swatch Group respectively.  
 (1) Location of production 
Richemont’s operations are mainly based in Switzerland, France, and Germany. More 
precisely, 86% of the production is located in Europe. According to the annual report from 
2010, Richemont does not have “employees working in manufacturing in Asia” (Compagnie 
Financière Richemont SA, 2011, p. 33). According to Swatch Groups annual report of 2010, 
the company operates worldwide and has subsidiaries in more than 37 countries. However, 
more detailed information about the locations of production were not published. 
 (2) Amount of water consumption 
Richemont has reported specific data about amount of water consumed since 2007/08. For 










). Apart from the information given, the report also states that the decrease was 
based on changes in the water-cooling system. Swatch Group reported information about the 
consumption of water over the entire period under review, except for 2008. However, instead 
of presenting specific numbers, the company displayed only the respective yearly decrease or 
increase. For example, in 2010, Swatch Group reported that “compared to the previous year, 
the consumption of drinking water was reduced by 1.7% and that of non-drinking water 
increased by only 1.4%” (The Swatch Group Ltd., 2009, p. 136)  
 (3) Amount of waste 
Although Richemont reported the total amount of waste in 2008 (3,599 tons), the company 
discontinued collecting data with respect to the amount of waste by type as well as by 
disposal method in 2009. This decision was explained within the annual report by a review of 
the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) related priorities. However, the priorities were not 
specified in more detail. Swatch Group reported information concerning its waste 
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management during the entire period from 2005 to 2010, except for 2008. The reporting 
included information about the quantity of special waste, the share of recycled special waste, 
and the recyclable portion of other industrial waste. However, instead of specific data, the 
company displayed merely the percentage increase/decrease of the yearly amount of waste. 
 (4) Amount of carbon emission 
Richemont has been measuring its carbon footprint since 2007. Within three years, the group 
became carbon free through activities such as sourcing energy from a “green supplier” and by 
purchasing carbon offsets equivalent to the prior year’s emissions and re-invoicing the cost of 
the offsets to the main emitters to increase awareness and to encourage efforts to reduce 
emissions. However, the reporting shows a continuous rise in volume, caused by an increase 
in general business. For example, during fiscal year 2010, Richemont had an increase in 
carbon of 24.8% (compared to 2009), accompanied by a 40% increase in sales. To measure its 
carbon footprint, the company has used a template adapted from the Greenhouse Gas Protocol 
of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), an internationally 
accepted tool for the report on greenhouse gas emissions. Swatch Group reported yearly 
changes as a percentage of its carbon emission. Apart from an increase in 2008, Swatch 
Group managed to decrease its emission every year. However, the company did not publish 
data with regard to carbon emissions in 2008. The company only stated that the emission 
“increased.” Information about the calculation of the carbon emission data was not displayed. 
 (5) Amount of energy consumption 
Richemont reported exact numbers of its total energy consumption. According to the 
respective reports, the company’s key energy usage is related to fuels, natural gas, heating and 
electricity, which the company consumes mainly with regard to its buildings and vehicles. 
While the energy consumption increased from 2008 to 2009, it decreased by 2% from 2009 to 
2010. The main significant source of energy is electricity. However, in 2010, 24% of 
Richemont’s purchased electricity was electricity generated from renewable sources such as 
solar and wind energy. Compared to 2009, the organization increased its “green electricity” 
consumption by 6% in absolute terms. Swatch Group reported the percentage increase or 
decrease of its yearly heat consumption as well as its electricity consumption separately. The 
company managed to decrease its heat consumption every year, except for 2008. Apart from 
an increase in 2007 and 2008, caused by a major rise in production, Swatch Group managed 
to decrease its yearly energy consumption. However, no specific data, either in terms of heat 
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consumption or in terms of electricity consumption, was published in 2008. Swatch Group 
stated only that heat consumption “increased slightly compared with the previous period,” 
while “electricity consumption rose to a lesser extent than the increase in the number of 
production hours” (The Swatch Group Ltd., 2009, p. 132). 
 (6) Number of initiatives toward employee training and development 
Richemont is collaborating with three different initiatives aimed at training and development 
of existing and future employees: (a) the Watchmakers of Switzerland Training and Education 
Programme (WOSTEP), (b) the Creative Academy in Milan, and (c) the Fondation de la 
Haute Horlogerie. 
 (a) WOSTEP is an initiative to develop craftsmanship skills that aims to secure the next 
generation of qualified watchmakers. 
(b) Richemont supports and collaborates with the Creative Academy in Milan. The “Master of 
Arts in Design” degree involves lectures from CEOs of Richemont’s various companies as 
well as other experts along with three-month internships across the group’s businesses. 
(c) In 2005, Richemont and others established the Fondation de la Haute Horlogerie, which 
fosters and promotes luxury watchmaking’s values of creativity, culture, and tradition 
internationally. One of the foundation’s main goals is to train fine watch professionals.  
Swatch Group reported only one officially sanctioned initiative that supports employee 
training and development, i.e. the six Nicolas G. Hayek Watchmaking Schools, founded by 
Swatch Group. Through these schools, the group trains students to become professional 
watchmakers. In 2010, 56 students passed their final exams with success, while 65 new 
candidates were admitted. 
 (7) Employee training and development expenditures 
Neither Richemont nor Swatch Group reported any data about expenditures with regard to 
employee training and development.  
 (8) Number of supported community projects 
Richemont as well as the group’s individual companies supported in total 15 different 
community projects. One of these projects is the Teacher of Ten Thousand Generations 
Foundation, which takes children out of factories, places them in schools, and underwrites 
their housing and education costs. Another project is presented by Laureus, which is an 
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organization that harnesses social interest in sports to promote social change. Richemont is 
one of the main supporters and sponsors of Laureus’s various initiatives including Laureus 
World Sports Academy, Laureus Sport for Good Foundation, and Laureus World Sports 
Awards. Swatch Group did not report information with respect to foundation support or 
community engagement in the period under review. 
 (9) Community expenditures 
Richemont displayed specific data about its expenditures with regard to community 
engagement. For example, in 2008/09, Richemont’s expenditures increased by 40% to 
EUR 20 million, which equates to around 2.4% of the company’s profits before tax. Swatch 
Group did not report any data about community expenditures. 
6.2 Analysis of Qualitative Data 
The gathered qualitative data is based on the conducted interviews and is illustrated with the 
assistance of the analysis tool MAXQDA. This subchapter presents qualitative data derived 
from the semi-structured interviews. The outcome of the three interview groups, i.e. 
organizations, interest groups and customers, is presented based on the themes detected 
through the coding of the interviews. As especially the interviews with Richemont and 
Swatch Group did not comprise questions directly referring to resilience or sustainability, the 
presented findings are not yet related to the detected links outlined in the conceptual 
framework. However, chapter 7 links the qualitative data with the quantitative data in order to 
interpret the data and build theory with regard to the answer to this study’s research question. 
 (1) Interviews with organizations 
 (a) Measures to deal with the financial crisis 
The interview with Richemont unfolded a focus on expansion in terms of the company’s 
brand and product portfolio, as a reaction to the financial crisis. In 2001, seven years prior to 
the financial crisis, Richemont initiated a company restructuring towards the expansion of the 
luxury goods business. Among other activities, the company extended its luxury brand 
portfolio, by engaging in a joint venture with Polo Ralph Lauren within this period. As the 
advent of the financial crisis decreased consumers’ confidence, which resulted in a significant 
decrease in demand, Richemont focused even more on the expansion of its luxury business. In 
2008, the company separated its luxury and non-luxury interests, mainly through large 
spinoffs, and furthermore pushed the extension of its brand and product portfolio to new 
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markets. In particular, the Asia Pacific region turned out to be a compensation for the 
decreased demand of luxury goods in Europe. Simultaneously, the organization tried to 
recover consumers’ confidence by increasing the amount of advertisements and company-
related information in annual reports as well as on the company’s website. 
The interview with Swatch Group revealed a similar approach in terms of consumer dialogue 
in response to the financial crisis. Similar to Richemont, Swatch Group perceived a sudden 
decline in demand as a consequence of the financial crisis. By advertising attributes, such as 
quality, tradition, and history, the company tried to regain former consumers and acquire new 
customers. Additionally, the interviewee revealed that, although no employees were let go as 
a consequence of the financial crisis, the company enforced other economies in cost, e.g. 
offers for employee training and development decreased in 2008. When asked about the main 
reasons for the company’s good performance during the financial crisis, the interviewee 
exposed the company’s broad product and brand portfolio. Specifically, the demand increase 
in one brand was compensated by the decreased demand for other brands of the group. 
 (b) Measures to deal with future shocks 
In terms of measures to deal with potential future shocks, the Richemont interviewee revealed 
a focus on increased stakeholder dialogue. Based on the observed decrease in consumers’ 
confidence as a result of the financial crisis, the company realized the importance of 
promoting and maintaining long-term trust with regard to stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
interviewee noted that Richemont perceived an increased stakeholder interest toward 
sustainability in the last ten years. In order to promote and maintain trust as well as to satisfy 
the increased interest in sustainability, the organization disclosed different codes of conduct 
and guidelines. Moreover, Richemont delivers a yearly corporate social responsibility report, 
in addition to the annual report. 
The interview with Swatch Group displayed a focus on the reduction of watch component 
delivery in order to strengthen the company’s position within the industry as well as to 
increase the barrier of entry for new companies. Furthermore, the interviewee expressed a 
focus on expanding the company’s mono brand store concept in order to increase control over 
sales, including the presentation and price of its watches, as well as to get information about 
the customer buying process. 
(2) Interview with interest group 
According to the interview with Amnesty International, as significant amount of work 
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remains to be done in terms of raw materials. A significant portion of sourced gold has no 
traceability, while the quantity of ethical gold is still too limited to satisfy the needs of the 
watch industry or other industries. The interviewee explained that the RJC offers a medium 
level of assurance and confidence, but the certification should be seen as the minimum 
standard. The Kimberly Process, as the main symbolic and international initiative, affects 
only conflicts, while environmental and social issues, such as corruption, are not taken into 
account. However, besides these weak points, each initiative forces participating players to 
raise questions that may not be asked otherwise. Moreover, the overall sourcing process is 
consolidated thanks to these initiatives. However, according to Amnesty International, the 
awareness of the problem with scarce metals and gemstones is still low within the general 
public. According to the interviewee, it is customers who are the crux of the matter:  
“If customers ask questions, such as ‘Do you know where the gold you sell comes 
from?’ or ‘Can you show me a written guarantee from your diamond suppliers stating 
that your diamonds are conflict-free?’ they can help to stop the trade of conflict and 
non-sustainable gold and diamonds.” 
By questioning the origin and sourcing of the materials composing the watches customers’ 
purchase, they force companies to act. Only if customers insist on certificates and guarantees 
that state that materials were sourced in an ethic and sustainable way will a fundamental and 
long-term industry restructuring take place. 
(3) Customer interviews 
 (a) Reason for the purchase 
According to customer interviews, the main reason for the purchase of a luxury watch was to 
reward either oneself or another person. Furthermore, all interviewees gave evidence that the 
purchase of a luxury watch is an informed decision rather than a spontaneous purchase. Only 
one interviewee stated that it could be a spontaneous purchase. However, the same 
interviewee simultaneously noted that this spontaneous purchase was currently rather 
unlikely. 
 (b) Criteria that positively influence the purchase of a luxury watch 
Customer interviews revealed that the main criteria leading to a purchase decision of a luxury 
watch are related to the processed material and the quality of the watch. All interviewees 
stated that these two criteria present significant influence factors in the purchase of a luxury 
watch. One customer noted: 
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“With a luxury watch, I mainly associate the quality of the watch as well as exclusive 
materials, such as gold or platinum. Hence, if I buy a new luxury watch, these aspects 
play the main role in the decision-making process. A price does not provide a luxury 
appeal – it’s the exclusive and scarce material and the high quality that differentiates a 
normal watch from a luxury watch.”  
In addition, the traditions of the watchmaking company as well as the location of production 
are almost equally important for the purchase decision process. Subsequent to material and 
quality, these two criteria were coded most frequently as four out of the five interviewees 
mentioned these criteria. The location of production becomes relevant, as low-wage countries 
are associated with low quality, while a long tradition is connected with better quality. One 
customer explained: 
“Switzerland is strongly associated with luxury watches. In my opinion, watchmaking 
companies of luxury watches are traditional brands. I´m attracted to a manufacturer 
that is interested in the sustainable receipt of a brand, while maintaining the local 




Customers gather information about the firm or brand they are interested in before buying a 
watch. However, the most relevant information concerns the tradition and history of the watch 
manufacturing company, brand, or specific watch model. The price of a watch, the 
manufacturer, and the status the watch affords do not seem to have a significant influence on 
the purchasing process, as each of these factors was mentioned only once.  
 (c) Criteria that negatively influence the purchase of a luxury watch 
All five interviews indicated that information linked to low labor and production conditions 
would influence their purchase decisions. Furthermore, four interviewees revealed that data 
about destruction of the environment or high pollution might lead to a decision against a 
watchmaking organization. Surprisingly, three interviewees also mentioned that 
organizations, which are not transparent in terms of information with regard to the product 
production process, might harm themselves. One interviewee noted: 
“If I see that humans suffer from poor labor conditions in terms of the production and 
material sourcing process and furthermore that the manufacturer does not provide any 
transparency to change or resolve this specific situation, the purchase of a watch from 
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this manufacturer will become highly unlikely. I don’t like the idea of ‘rewarding’ a 
company with a high amount of money and, thus, indirectly advocat[ing] incorrect and 
unsocial behavior.” 
However, from the interviews it became apparent that customers do not specifically gather 
information about these issues by themselves. Their decisions are mainly influenced by media 
coverage related to this field. 
(d) Interest in the production process 
The interviews revealed that consumers of luxury watches are interested in the production 
process; specifically, all five interviewees mentioned interest in this field. This aspect seems 
to become especially important when it comes to the country where the production takes 
place, as outsourcing to Asian countries is associated with lower quality and craftsmanship. 
For example, one interviewee explained:  
“I associate a watch that is ‘Made in Asia’ with low quality, whereas ‘Made in 
Switzerland’ is associated with high quality and luxury.” 
Concluding, this subchapter’s aim was to outline all research results from the quantitative as 
well as qualitative data. Subsequently, the interpretation an the answer to the research 
question within chapter 7 will be followed by this study’s overall conclusion in chapter 8. 
7 Research Results 
This chapter interprets and validates the previously presented quantitative and qualitative data 
to discover whether or not sustainability (i.e. ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals 
and gemstones and transparency towards sustainability) have an effect on organizations’ 
resilience. Initially, the quantitative data regarding the organizations’ share prices is 
interpreted to validate Richemont’s and Swatch Group’s level of resilience with regard to the 
financial crisis. Afterwards, the data retrieved from the annual reports and the conducted 
interviews is interpreted along the two previously mentioned detected links. 
 Resilience 
The results of the analysis of the data related to both company’s financial data and stock price 
development in subchapter 6.1.1 detected three main outcomes. First of all, Richemont was 
able to recover faster from the shock in the context of the financial crisis, meaning the 
company was able to return to its equilibrium, i.e. pre-crisis level, with regard to the stock 
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price development in less time. Secondly, during the entire recovery since hitting bottom, 
Richemont’s stock price development was continuously superior towards that of Swatch 
Group. Still, it was detected that both companies’ stock price developments often followed 
market based ups and downs. Thirdly, Richemont’s overall percentage decrease in share price 
was lower, compared to that of the Swatch Group. As a preliminary conclusion, based on the 
quantitative financial data utilized within the scope if this study, Richemont can be considered 
as more resilient with regard to the industry shock in the context of the financial crisis.  
 Scarce metals and gemstones 
As outlined in subchapter 6.1.2, the two companies of the represented sample of this study 
were investigated with regard to the number of ofi initiatives both have been active in and 
how long this activity has been undertaken. Richemont has exhibited high efforts in terms of 
sustainable and ethical sourcing of scarce materials and gemstones by being a member in 
three different initiatives. In contrast to that, Swatch Group has engaged in only one officially 
sanctioned initiative. While Richemont reported its first initiative-related engagement in 2005, 
Swatch Group reported its first engagement in 2010.  
Within the scope of this study, the investigation had to be based on the information that was 
publicly available with regard to the measures of sustainability described earlier. Even though 
it might be the case that a company is engaged within any initiative that is related to the scope 
of investigation, only those initiatives can be considered that this study was able to detect and 
analyze. Based on this assumption and the study’s findings, it can be preliminary concluded 
that Richemont’s involvement in initiatives that aim to avoid the trade and sourcing of 
conflict and non-sustainable metals and gemstones, more specifically quantity and duration of 
the respective engagement, is superior to Swatch Group’s involvement. Within the scope of 
this study and based on the measures for environmental sustainability investigated, it will thus 
be concluded that Richemont is the more sustainable company. 
 Transparency in terms of sustainability 
Chapter 6.1.3 investigated the amount of reported data relevant for the determination of both 
companies’ degree of sustainability, i.e. the measures of transparency described within the 
same subchapter. Specific quantitative data with regard to the amount of e.g. energy 
consumption or the amount of employee training and development expenditures merely serve 
as examples for the respective reporting. The absolute numbers were neither compared nor 
interpreted, as this would not have been academically feasible since comparing absolutes 
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between different companies can lead to false interpretations and conclusions. More precisely, 
this chapter interprets the amount of relevant reported data and thus the organizational level of 
transparency. As only two companies are compared within the scope of this study, it is 
assumed that a higher amount of reporting of relevant data is equal to stronger transparency. 
Table 3 presents a summary of the quantitative data related to aspects of transparency 
retrieved from the annual reports of Richemont and Swatch Group. Along all transparency 
measures, the “X” displays the organization that presented more relevant and in-depth data in 
the respective category. 
Table 3: Summary of quantitative data with regard to transparency 
As indicated in the table above, it can be preliminary concluded that Richemont is generally 
more transparent than Swatch Group in terms of the transparency measurements conducted in 
subchapter 6.1.3. Although both organizations appear to be rather inaccurate in terms of data 
related to the location of production, Richemont reported more relevant data. Furthermore, 
compared to Richemont, Swatch Group is lacking in terms of depth, availability, and 
relevance of the entire data, especially in terms of specific figures regarding the amount of 
consumption. By displaying only the percentage change, Swatch Group does not offer 
effective traceability, especially since data from 2008 was either not published or replaced by 
vague statements. With regard to employee training and development programs, Richemont 
seems to be even more involved. While Richemont constantly engaged in three initiatives 
with regard to employee training and development programs, Swatch Group supported only 
one initiative. In contrast to all the previous findings, neither organization reported 
expenditures with regard to employee training and development. In addition, it becomes 
apparent that both organizations are lacking data in terms of the assessment of the intensity or 
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quality of training and development efforts or the benefits for employees and managers. At 
last and with regard to community engagement, Richemont seems to be superior by disclosing 
several community-related initiatives including the utilized amount of expenditures, whereas 
Swatch Group did not report any community-related engagement at all. The preliminary 
conclusion encompassing all findings concerning transparency in terms of sustainability is 
that Richemont is more transparent. Within the scope of this study and with regard to the 
measures investigated, it is assumed that Richemont is more sustainable.  
Based on the results derived from the overall quantitative data, Richemont´s level of 
resilience seems to be related to the measures of sustainability that have been investigated 
within the scope of this study. This preliminary finding is supported by findings the 
qualitative data gathered in the interviews with representatives of this study’s selected sample, 
i.e. Richemont and Swatch Group. While both companies revealed increasing consumers’ 
confidence as a measure of coping with the financial crisis, Richemont valued this aspect as 
also important related to potential future shocks. The latter is based on the assumption that by 
increasing the disclosure of diverse company data, e.g. aspects of environmental 
sustainability, Richemont aims to strengthen consumers’ trust in the company. Consequently, 
the assumption that Richemont is more transparent in terms of sustainability-related aspects is 
reinforced and underlines that Richemont has detected a relation between certain measures of 
sustainability and resilience as well. 
Apart from the findings in terms of transparency, the qualitative data gathered in the 
interviews with representatives of this study’s selected sample revealed other measures, which 
were related to the financial crisis in 2007/08. While Richemont focused on the extension of 
its product and brand portfolio in order to cope with the financial crisis, Swatch Group 
initiated the reduction of the watch component delivery in order to increase the barrier of 
entry for competitors as well as new market entrants. Even though these measures might have 
a positive effect on both companies’ resilience towards future shocks and might thus be of 
relevance for this study’s research question, it can be concluded that these measures are not 
related to sustainability in the context of this study’s perspective of investigation. 
Consequentially, these findings will be ignored. 
As the interview with the interest group Amnesty International rather served as an additional 
source of information concerning ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and 
gemstones, the interpretable data towards the research questions is limited. Still, the 
qualitative data gathered from this interview reinforced the already detected importance of 
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being a member in officially sanctioned initiatives, which aim to improve the ethical and 
sustainable trade of scarce metals and gemstones. According to the interviewee, only 
officially sanctioned initiatives actually guarantee a minimum of traceability of scarce metals 
and gemstones. Inferred from that, within the scope of this study it is assumed that a potential 
non-existence of membership in the respective initiatives is considered as not acting 
sustainable as well as ethical in terms of scarce materials and gemstones. This assumption 
contributes to the previous findings and supports the result that Richemont is considered more 
sustainable in terms of scarce metals and gemstones.  
The customer interviewees emphasized the importance of sustainability related to all fields of 
organization. Based on the findings of subchapter 6.2, aspects associated with poor labor 
conditions and climate change appear to be of high interest. Moreover, this aspect’s linkage to 
a potential purchase decision seems to have strengthened as well, especially in those cases 
where the company might be confronted with negative headlines concerning working 
conditions. The basis of this development is mostly grounded on customers’ increased desire 
to not only purchase a product but to purchase it without having negative feelings concerning 
the circumstances in which the product was manufactured. However, none of the customer 
interviewees revealed that aspects of climate change or a lack of general transparency have 
ever effectively eliminated the desire to make a specific purchase. Moreover, all interviewees 
gave the impression that, although transparency was virtually unanimously classified as 
important, none of the interviewees ever conducted actual in-depth research on e.g. the target 
company’s labor conditions or efforts towards climate change before purchasing a watch.  
These contrary findings complicate making distinct assumptions and drawing clear 
conclusions. On the one hand, it could be assumed that on the basis of this study’s conducted 
consumer interviews, a relation between the investigated measures of sustainability, i.e. 
ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones and transparency, and 
resilience has to be denied. As underlying reason, it could be formulated that even if these 
aspects have increased in importance, a potential non-existence appears to have limited 
influence on the actual purchase decision. Consequently, it would have to be assumed that 
with the lack of influence on purchase decisions, companies’ resilience would also be 
unrelated to sustainability as being sustainable would not result in increased or at least 
constant demand and assist the company to be resilient under troubling circumstances, e.g. 
industry shocks. On the other hand, it could be assumed that the detected lack of actual 
influence on consumers’ purchase decision might be of minor interest and thus, the denial of 
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the relation between sustainability and resilience regarding the qualitative data gathered from 
the consumer interviews overhasty. The initial preliminary conclusion dismisses the increased 
importance of ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones and 
transparency under circumstances where a luxury watchmaking company is confronted with a 
specific transparency-requiring situation. Even if a purchase price decision appears to be 
unrelated from the described measures of sustainability, the increase in consumer interest has 
been proven previously. Consequently, it could be assumed that organizations must have the 
respective measures of sustainability available in order to be resilient in case e.g. media 
coverage reveals that a certain aspect of the watchmaking process violates environmental 
agreements. In order to be resilient towards such a situation, the proposed measures of 
sustainability, i.e. ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones and 
transparency, would indeed be related to resilience. In summary, one could assume that 
customers’ awareness as well as requirements with regard to general transparency 
continuously increases. However, only a fraction of customers would agree that a lack of 
transparency has effectively modified a purchase decision.  
Within the scope of this thesis the overall preliminary conclusion concerning a potential 
relation between the proposed measures of sustainability and resilience are based on a short- 
and long-term perspective. In the short-term, the qualitative data of the conducted consumer 
interviews detected that no relation between sustainability and resilience is assumed based on 
the lack of influence on actual purchase decision. With a long-term perspective, however, it 
can be assumed that a relation indeed exists, as the described measures of sustainability have 
become consumer requirements that any luxury watchmaking company has to comply with. 
Resilience with regard to future shocks has been proven to be related to measures of 
sustainability, i.e. ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones and 
transparency. This preliminary conclusion might be applicable to other products from the 
luxury price segment as well, as any consumer might be relatively uninterested in negative 
aspects as long as they are beyond a certain knowledge horizon. However, the social outcry 
can differ significantly under certain circumstances and consequences for economic results. 
8 Conclusion and Limitations 
The 21
st
 century is characterized by the increasingly competitive economic environment and 
the strive for efficiency at any level of the market environment, among other aspects. The 
resulting market sensitivity is affected by predictable, but also unpredictable disturbances 
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with increasing frequency. As outlined in this study, these disturbances have the potential to 
create shocks that might restructure entire industries and result in exits and market-phase out 
by established firms. Companies that are able to survive such disruptions are considered 
“resilient”. Recent changes to the ecological environment generated adjusted consumer 
requirements towards any organization. More specifically, this study has found that 
consumers are increasingly interested in companies’ ability to balance business activities with 
unburdening and protecting the environment at the same time, i.e. being sustainable.  
Existing research mostly relates sustainability to a company’s level of performance. This 
study changes the dependent variable “performance” to the previously described term 
“resilience”. As a result, the research question aims to investigate how sustainability is related 
to organizations’ resilience. This study applied the theoretical background to the financial 
crisis in 2007/08. The respective event was considered an appropriate industry disruption on 
which a representative industry sample is tested for resilience. Above all, however, this study 
investigates whether any activities related to sustainability have played an essential part in 
resilience. The described industry sample encompassed two of the biggest companies of the 
Swiss luxury watch making industry. 
This study’s analysis of quantitative and qualitative data revealed that various industries are 
confronted with new and changing customer needs towards an increased interest in 
sustainability. As a result, companies are forced to develop solutions that satisfy these needs 
in order to be competitive. This study detected that the investigated measures of 
sustainability, i.e. ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones and 
transparency, are of significant relevance for companies within the luxury watchmaking 
industry. Moreover, this study also concluded that the existence or non-existence of measures 
of sustainability could be related to the industry sample’s resilience concerning the financial 
crisis. More specifically, it has been found that Richemont was more resilient with regard to 
the vent of the financial crisis in 2007/08. Firstly, the company was able to recover faster 
from the effects of the financial crisis with regard to the stock price development. Secondly, 
Richemont’s stock price development was continuously superior towards that of Swatch 
Group during the recovery. Lastly, Richemont’s overall percentage decrease in share price 
was lower compared to that of the Swatch Group. The conclusion that the existence of 
measures of sustainability could be related to resilience was based on the findings regarding 
Richemont’s involvement in initiatives that aim to avoid the trade and sourcing of conflict 
and non-sustainable metals and gemstones as well as all findings concerning transparency. 
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To begin with the final conclusion of this study, Richemont was superior towards Swatch 
Group concerning the set of investigated measures of sustainability and thus considered more 
sustainable. Moreover, it was found that Richemont is more resilient with regard to the 
company’s stock price recovery within the timeframe of the financial crisis. Concluding, 
within the scope of this study, i.e. in view of the company’s engagement concerning 
environmental sustainability as well as which measures of sustainability were reported more 
transparently and also more specifically, Richemont’s measures with regard to sustainability 
can be related to the companies resilience in the course of the financial crisis of 2007/08. 
Based on this conclusion, two prepositions are derived from this study. These prepositions 
present testable ideas for future studies or research, which can be utilized for further theory 
development. 
 P1: Transparency towards sustainability, especially with regard to aspects of social 
and environmental sustainability, increase established firms’ ability to be resilient 
 P2: Sustainability related to sustainable and ethical trade of scarce materials 
increases established firms’ ability to be resilient 
Figure 5: Conceptual Framework (adapted) 
Even though the considered quantitative and qualitative data has been sufficient for a 
meaningful conclusion within the scope of this study, this study is also accompanied by 
certain limitations that need to be considered within the interpretation of the results. While 
some limitations are related to the chosen methodology, other limitations are inherent to the 
investigated industry and thus, cannot be changed.  
The first limitation corresponded to the approach used in this study, i.e. the comparative case 
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study. Although this approach is suitable for detailed and comprehensive assessments of 
individual events, it also has limitations. Most case studies’ generalizability of the findings is 
limited, particularly with regard to observations and patterns. Although quantitative 
information on a large part of the Swiss luxury watch making industry was included within 
this study, the in-depth analyses were limited to the two companies of the representative 
industry sample. As described within this study, however, the homogenous character of the 
oligopoly industry allows deriving implications for the entire Swiss watch making industry. 
Still, it has to be underlined that this study would significantly benefit from comprising a 
larger sample in order to draw more specific assumptions as well as increase the amount of 
generalizable conclusions. The second limitation relates to the availability of (qualitative) data 
used. Several aspects of sustainability and resilience affect different departments within a 
company. However, as this study’s timeframe merely allowed conducting one interview per 
company, the gathered qualitative data was limited to the knowledge and will to share 
information of the respective. Apart from that, the demanded requirements towards 
confidentiality reduced utilizable qualitative data even more. Thus, additional interviewees 
from different departments would have provided further insights, which would have allowed 
for an enhanced interpretation and potentially more distinct conclusions. The third limitation 
refers to the collection of an increase data basis and the consideration of additional measures 
of sustainability. On the one hand, the quantitative data applied within this study is the most 
appropriate information available for the present case study. However, additional data might 
have provided further insights that might have resulted in more diversified conclusions. On 
the other hand, the study at hand was limited to two specific aspects of sustainability, i.e. 
ethical and sustainable sourcing of scarce metals and gemstones and transparency, in order to 
investigate a potential relation to the industry sample’s resilience in the course of the financial 
crisis of 2007/08. However, resilience is also affected by numerous other factors of 
sustainability. Therefore, future research might investigate other aspects of resilience and 
sustainability in order to come to more detailed and extensive conclusions about the relation 
between resilience and sustainability.  
In conclusion, the availability of sound data presents one of the biggest challenges that a 
researcher has to manage. This study’s theory building allows future research to investigate 
additional measures, which might close existing gaps of data and enhance as well as support 
the general conclusion of this study by determining a more generalizable perspective on how 
sustainability and resilience are related. 
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 Appendix  
Interview transcript Christian Steinmetz 
Date of the interview: 23th November, 2014   
Interviewer: Hannah Werner (HW)   
Interviewee: Christian Steinmetz (CS): owner and consumer of luxury watches 
Conducted language: German, personally conducted in Hamburg, Germany  
 
HW: Guten Tag, Herr Steinmetz. Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit für dieses Interview 
genommen haben. Wie im Vorfeld bereits besprochen interessiert mich Ihre Meinung sowie 
Ihre Beweggründe hinsichtlich dem Kauf von Luxusuhren.  
CS: Vielen Dank für die Einladung zu diesem Interview. Ich hoffe ich kann Ihnen 
entsprechend weiter helfen.  
HW: Da bin ich mir sicher. Es gibt kein richtig oder falsch – ich interessiere mich 
ausschließlich für Ihre Meinung zu diesem Thema. Haben Sie vorab noch Fragen? 
CS: Nein, ich denke nicht. Wir können gern starten. 
HW: Ok. Sehr gerne. Als Luxusuhren werden all solche Modelle verstanden, für welche ein 
Kaufpreis von mindestens EUR 1000 oder mehr im regulären Handel gezahlt wird. Besitzen 
Sie eine oder mehrere Uhren dieser Kategorie? 
CS: Ja, ich besitze zwei Uhren dieser Kategorie. 
HW: Haben Sie sich diese Uhren selbst gekauft oder geschenkt bekommen? 
CS: Beide Uhren waren ein Geschenk. 
HW: Würden Sie sich eine Uhr dieser Kategorie auch selbst kaufen? Und wenn ja, unter 
welchem Umständen kommt für Sie eine solche Entscheidung in Frage? 
CS: Ja, definitiv. Jederzeit. Allerdings nehme ich jedoch an, dass ich dies nur zu einem 
besonderen Anlass tun würde. Einen Spontankauf schließe ich eigentlich aus.  
HW: Was ist Ihnen bei dem Kauf einer Luxusuhr besonders wichtig - welche Charakteristika 
in Bezug auf den Hersteller und das Produkt spielen für Sie eine Rolle? 
CS: Ich denke mir ist besonders der symbolische Wert der Uhr wichtig. Die Materialien, die 
Marke, der Preis und viele weitere Faktoren spielen dahingehend eine Rolle, dass diese die 
Grundlage für die Existenz eines symbolischen Wertes sind. Existiert dieser jedoch nicht, 
dann kann die Uhr noch so wertvoll oder besonders gefertigt sein. Diese Uhr würde mich in 
der Regel immer weniger reizen, als eine Uhr mit Symbolcharakter. 
HW: Was sind die Beweggründe für Sie sich eine Luxusuhr zu kaufen?  
CS: Ich denke der Hauptgrund für den Kauf ist für mich immer mich selber oder eine zu 
beschenkende Person für etwas zu belohnen. Die Entscheidung ist also emotional bestimmt. 
Der Status oder was die Uhr repräsentiert spielt keine Rolle für mich. Momentan reizt mich 
auch nicht der Kauf einer Uhr, nur weil ich dies als gutes Geschäft erachten würde. Solche 
Beweggründe würde ich vielleicht später als potentieller Sammler in Erwägung ziehen. Daher 
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bevorzuge ich es derzeit dezente Uhren zu tragen. Mich reizt zu wissen, dass auch eine 
unscheinbare Uhr sehr wertvoll sein kann.  
HW: Und welche Rolle spielt das Material einer Luxusuhr für Sie? 
CS: Wie gesagt ist das Material die Grundlage für mich, so dass eine Uhr einen symbolischen 
Wert bekommen kann. Ich will das Gefühl haben, dass die Uhr hinsichtlich ihrer 
Verarbeitung und aber auch vor allem aufgrund ihrer Materialien ihr Geld wert ist. Die 
Wertigkeit insgesamt, und das umfasst auch den Produktionsprozess, ist mir an einer Uhr am 
wichtigsten. Wenn ich meine einen reinen „Markenaufschlag“ beim Preis einer Uhr zu 
entdecken, so verliert diese relativ schnell an Attraktivität.  
HW: Sie würden eine Uhr also nicht allein, aufgrund der Marke kaufen? 
CS: Nein. Aber, durchaus aufgrund der Qualität und der Tradition, die hinter der Markersteht. 
Sobald das Gefühl entsteht, dass die Marke diesen Faktoren, wie Qualität und Tradition nicht 
mehr gerecht wird, sondern sich auf Ihrer Marke und dem Image „ausruht“, würde Sie für 
mich uninteressant werden. 
HW: Ok. Und welche Rolle spielt der Produktionsprozess einer Luxusuhr für Sie? 
CS: Ich vermute, dass der Großteil der potentiellen Käufer sich nie über den 
Produktionsprozess einer Uhr Gedanken macht. Ich für meinen Teil kann jedoch sagen, dass 
ich mich, wenn auch oberflächlich, in der Regel mit dem Produktionsprozess des 
entsprechenden Herstellers auseinandersetze. Dabei spiel für mich auch der 
Produktionsstandort eine große Rolle. Die Schweiz verbinde ich beispielsweise stark mit 
Luxusuhren. Luxusuhrenhersteller sind in der Regel Traditionsmarken. Ich bin an einem 
Hersteller interessiert, wenn ich der Meinung bin dieser ist an dem nachhaltigen Erhalt seiner 
Marke und des lokalen Wirtschaftsstandorts interessiert ist. Outsourcing, insbesondere nach 
Asien, mindert meiner Meinung nach den symbolischen Wert einer Uhr.  
HW: Also würden Sie eine Luxusuhr die in Asien hergestellt wurde nicht kaufen? 
CS: Nein, definitiv nicht.  
HW: Informieren Sie sich vor einem potentiellen Kauf einer Luxusuhr über den Hersteller 
bzw. vergleichen Sie verschiedene Hersteller? 
CS: Ich denke ich habe vor jedem Kauf eine Vorstellung davon, was für eine Uhr ich suche, 
z.B. einen Chronographen oder eine sportliche, robuste Uhr. Mit dieser Denkweise habe ich 
dann bereits ein paar Hersteller im Kopf von denen ich meine dass diese in eine enge 
Auswahl fallen. In der Regel kenne ich diese Hersteller dann auch bereits zumindest ein 
wenig, kann mir etwas unter der Marke und dem Produkt vorstellen.  
HW: Und welche Informationen sind dabei von Relevanz für Sie? 
CS: Besonders relevant sind für mich die Tradition des Herstellers, das Firmenalter und das 
Image des Herstellers und der Marke. Hinzu kommen dann die Produktionsweise und vor 
allem, wie schon erwähnt auch der Produktionsstandort. Von der Qualität der verbauten 
Materialien gehe ich dann in erster Instanz aus, lasse mich jedoch in der Regel über alle 
Details der Uhr vor dem Kauf vom Juwelier bzw. Verkäufer informieren.  
HW: Gäbe es unternehmens- bzw. herstellerrelevante Informationen, die Sie von dem Kauf 
einer Luxusuhr einer bestimmten Marke bzw. von dem entsprechenden Unternehmen 
abhalten würden? 
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CS: Ja. Im Endeffekt wären das alle Informationen welche darauf hindeuten dass der 
Hersteller nicht meinen Vorstellungen aus den vorangegangen Fragen bzw. Antworten  
entspricht. Wenn ich erkenne, dass es sich bei der Uhr um ein Produkt handelt, unter welchem 
Menschen im Rahmen der Produktion oder der Materialgewinnung offensichtlich leiden und 
der Hersteller wenig Transparenz und Aufklärungsarbeit leistet um eine bestimmte Situation 
zu ändern oder darüber aufzuklären, dann rückt ein potentieller Kauf für mich sehr schnell in 
den Bereich einer großen Unwahrscheinlichkeit. Mir gefällt der Gedanke nicht, eine Firma 
mit einer hohen Summe für eine Uhr zu „belohnen“ und damit inkorrektes und unsoziales 
Verhalten, sei es auf jeglichen Teil der Produktion oder der Materialgewinnung bezogen, 
indirekt zu befürworten.  
HW: Aber Sie sagten doch zuvor, dass sie sich nicht konkret über den Hersteller informieren. 
Oder habe ich das falsch verstanden.  
CS: Das stimmt. Zwar informiere ich mich nicht konkret über diese Themen, allerdings würde 
ich ein Unternehmen, dass aufgrund schlechter Arbeitsbedingungen, Ausbeutung oder 
ähnlichem in der Kritik der Medien steht, nicht weiter mit meinem Kauf unterstützen. Der 
Fall Schlecker in Deutschland ist evtl. ein vergleichbares Beispiel. Natürlich habe ich mich 
nie in Jahresberichten oder ähnlichem konkret über das Unternehmen informiert, bevor ich 
dort eingekauft habe. Aber, nachdem bekannt wurde, dass die Mitarbeiter dort systematisch 
ausgebeutet werden, habe ich die Schlecker-Märkte vollständig gemieden und bei der 
Konkurrenz eingekauft. Ich denke, dass diese Aufdeckung der Medien und der damit 
verbundene drastische Rückgang der Kunden, letztlich auch zur Insolvenz geführt hat.  
HW: Würden Sie sagen, dass das Aufdecken negativer Geschäftstätigkeiten, selbst größte 
Unternehmen in die Insolvenz treiben kann? 
CS: Nicht zwangsläufig. Aber, wie man an dem Schlecker Beispiel und anderen Beispielen 
sehen kann, kann das durchaus passieren. Insbesondere bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen, oder 
negativen Schlagzeilen in Verbindung mit Tieren und der Umwelt, reagieren Kunden oder 
zumindest ich selbst sehr empfindlich.  
HW: Darf ich dann nochmal ganz konkret fragen, würden Sie eine Luxusuhr kaufen wollen, 
von der Sie wissen, dass die Gewinnung der Materialien gesundheitliche Schäden, bei den 
Menschen verursacht, die für den Abbau diese Materialien zuständig sind? 
CW: Nein. Gleiches gilt für Kinderarbeit oder andere Menschenrechtsverletzungen, 
Ausbeutung, oder ähnliches.  
HW: Aber die Herkunft der Materialien Ihrer Uhren kennen Sie nicht, oder? 
CW: Nein. Allerdings handelte es sich bei diesen schließlich auch um ein Geschenk. Aber ich 
vermute, nach diesem Interview werde ich mich bei einem potentiellen Kauf zukünftiger 
Uhren, genauer über den Hersteller bzw. die Marke und besagte Faktoren informieren.  
HW: Gut. Ich denke, dann habe ich soweit erst mal keine weiteren Fragen mehr und bedanke 
mich sehr herzlich für das Interview. Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich die Zeit dafür genommen 
haben und so ausführlich geantwortet haben. Sie haben mir wirklich sehr geholfen. Bei 
Interesse stelle ich Ihnen gern meine Masterarbeit nach Fertigstellung zur Verfügung.  
CS: Ja das wäre toll. Vielen Dank. Lassen Sie mich wissen, wenn Sie noch Fragen haben.  
HW: Nochmals vielen Dank.  
